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Abstract
We study informed principal problems in a bilateral trade environment
where a seller and a buyer have private information about independent
types affecting their interdependent valuations. The seller has full bargain-
ing power to offer a mechanism. We prove both the existence of a D1
equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium interim payoff vector for
the seller. The uniqueness result holds even if the refinement concept is
weakened to the intuitive criterion under certain regularity conditions. The
refined equilibrium payoff vectors for both players are characterized by the
seller’s best incentive-feasible allocation among those that are ex post in-
centive compatible and individually rational for the buyer. The allocation
takes a simple format of (almost-)fixed prices if the virtual surplus is strictly
increasing in the buyer’s type. We show that the privacy of the seller’s in-
formation causes undersupply of the good and reduces both players’ interim
payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), a number of studies
have discovered the efficiency properties of various mechanisms in bilateral trade
environments. Most previous studies have assumed that the trading mechanism
is either exogenously given or endogenously designed by a third party (e.g., social
planner, broker) with no private information. By contrast, we assume that an
informed seller has full bargaining power to offer a mechanism to an informed
buyer in the mechanism-selection game. Thus, our model has both aspects of
screening and signaling.1 The goal of this paper is to make a clear prediction
about what kind of mechanisms are selected in the signaling game.
Although our analysis covers the case of private values, the main focus is on
the case of interdependent values.2 The interdependency is common in many trad-
ing situations. Classical examples are the used car market analyzed by Akerlof
(1970) and the job market by Spence (1973). Another example is the auction
environment studied by Milgrom and Weber (1982). Each bidder’s private in-
formation may affect potential traders’ valuations in auctions of bills and notes
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, drilling rights for mineral resources by
the Department of the Interior, spectrum licenses by the Federal Communications
Commission, and so on. We can consider the mechanism-selection game as a post-
auction resale stage. So, our analysis can help auction designers to understand
how an informed winner resells an awarded item to a loser or an outside party.
The difficulty in the analysis is that the mechanism-selection game may have
multiple equilibria whereas standard approaches to signaling games are not readily
applicable. The inapplicability comes from the fact that the infinite set of all mech-
anisms has by nature no order structure as a signal space. So, we cannot apply
constructive methods to prove the existence of a refined equilibrium. Moreover,
in the literature on informed principal problems (as in the signaling literature), it
seems that no consensus has been reached on what refinement criterion is more
“reasonable” than others. We mainly focus on the intuitive criterion and criterion
D1 developed by Cho and Kreps (1987), but also explore the relationships among
these two and other existing criteria.
To justify the intutive criterion, Cho and Kreps (1987) suggest an implicit
“speech” by a sender. In the mechanism-selection game, the signal space (i.e. the
set of all mechanisms) is so rich that the seller may be able to make a more “elo-
1See Riley (2001) for a survey of the literature on screening and signaling.
2Fieseler et al. (2003) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade
in an environment with interdependent values where property rights are (possibly) dispersed.
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quent” speech than in games with restricted signal spaces. That is, if a commonly
known equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion, then some type of seller can offer
a well-designed mechanism to convey some information on her type to the buyer.
The analysis centers around the Rothschild–Stiglitz–Wilson (RSW) allocation
introduced by Maskin and Tirole (1992). It is defined as a best allocation for all
types of the seller among those that are “safe” in the sense of Myerson (1983), that
is, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) for the seller and both ex post incentive
compatible (EPIC) and ex post individually rational (EPIR) for the buyer.3 The
buyer with any belief about the seller’s type can honestly participate in the RSW
allocation, provided that the seller tells the truth. Any RSW allocation is interim
individually rational (IIR) for the seller. The seller’s interim payoff vector is unique
among all RSW allocations.
Our main results are summarized as follows. First, we prove that the mechanism-
selection game has a D1 equilibrium where the seller offers an RSW allocation,
and that, in any D1 equilibrium, the interim payoff vectors for both players are
characterized by some RSW allocation. A key step in the existence part is to
prove that the RSW allocation is undominated (from the viewpoint of different
types of seller) given some posterior belief about the seller’s type. The belief is,
in turn, used to obtain off-the-path beliefs for the buyer that pass D1 and prevent
the seller’s deviation from the RSW allocation. The characterization result holds
even if the refinement concept is weakened to the intuitive criterion, provided that
the seller’s type is binary or her valuation is private.
Second, we investigate the properties of RSW allocations. The allocation takes
a simple format of (almost-)fixed prices if the virtual surplus is strictly increas-
ing in the buyer’s type. The RSW allocation assigns a good to maximize the
seller’s expected surplus reduced by not only information rents to the buyer but
also signaling costs to the seller herself. Thus, the allocation entails more severe
undersupply than a full-information allocation (i.e., an optimal mechanism for the
seller with commonly known types) does. As a result, the privacy of the seller’s
information reduces not only the seller’s interim payoffs but also the buyer’s ex
post payoffs. On the other hand, if the buyer’s valuation is private, then the
seller has no signaling incentive, and thus, the RSW allocation is equivalent to the
full-information allocation.
3The RSW allocation is equivalent to the “best safe mechanism” analyzed by Myerson (1991).
In signaling models, the RSW allocation is also called the “Riley outcome” after Riley (1979).
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Relations to the literature
This paper belongs to the informed principal literature developed by Myerson
(1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992). Myerson (1983) discovers the “in-
scrutability principle,” which states that any equilibrium allocation of the mechanism-
selection game arises from a fully pooling equilibrium. The inscrutability principle
itself, however, tells us nothing about whether the game has a refined equilibrium.
Myerson (1983) proposes many solution concepts such as strong solution (i.e., safe
and undominated mechanism). A drawback of the strong solution is that it is
too strong to exist in general. He then introduces the weaker concepts of neutral
optimum and core mechanism, and proves the existence of a neutral optimum (and
thus a core mechanism).4
Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) undertake thorough analyses in single-agent
environments with independent private values and common values, respectively.
Maskin and Tirole (1992) characterize the set of equilibrium allocations by show-
ing that it consists of (incentive-)feasible allocations that weakly dominate RSW
allocations. They show that the RSW allocation is the unique equilibrium alloca-
tion that passes the intuitive criterion. They also provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of an allocation that passes the Farrell–Grossman–
Perry (FGP) criterion.5 Maskin and Tirole (1992) do not, however, make these
refinement analyses in the case where not only the principal but also the agent
has private information.
In independent private-value environments with multiple informed agents, Mylo-
vanov and Tro¨ger (2012) define the concept of strongly neologism-proof allocation
and prove that it exists and is an equilibrium allocation of the mechanism-selection
game. Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2014) provide an envelope characterization of the
strongly neologism-proof allocation and show that it is an ex ante optimal alloca-
tion.
Our result implies that the relationships among the existing refinement con-
cepts (or solution concepts) in our model are summarized in Figure 1.6 In the
figure, “criterion a → criterion b” means that if an allocation passes criterion a,
then it also passes criterion b. Notice that the intuitive criterion is a minimal
4Myerson (1983) justifies the concept of core mechanism by suggesting a hypothetical speech
by the principal. The content is different from that suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987).
5Farrell (1993) and Grossman and Perry (1986) originally introduce the refinement concepts
of “neologism-proof equilibrium” and “perfect sequential equilibrium” respectively.
6See van Damme (1991) for other refinement concepts in signaling games. In generic finite
signaling games, any “stable outcome” (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) is “universally divine”
(Banks and Sobel, 1987) and thus passes D1.
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requirement. An allocation that passes an underlined criterion always exists. It is
shown that the other criteria are too strong in our environment with interdepen-
dent values. In fact, an allocation that passes the FGP criterion exists if and only
if the RSW allocation is undominated (i.e., a strong solution exists). Moreover, a
strongly neologism-proof allocation exists if and only if any RSW allocation is a
full-information allocation (i.e., the seller’s privacy is irrelevant to her payoffs).
Strongly  
Neologism-proofness 
Intuitive Criterion FGP 
Neutral Optimum Strong Solution 
D1 
Core Mechaism 
Figure 1: Relations among the refinement concepts
There are recent developments in the literature on informed principal prob-
lems.7 Severinov (2008) considers a correlated-type environment with more than
one informed agent and shows that each type of principal extracts all expected so-
cial surplus in a perfect sequential equilibrium, as in Cre´mer and McLean (1988).
He also proves that a feasible allocation is a neutral optimum if and only if the
feasible allocation is ex post efficient and gives each type of principal the expected
maximum social surplus. Cella (2008) considers a correlated private-value environ-
ment with an informed agent and shows that the principal benefits from the privacy
of her information in an equilibrium. Bedard (2017) finds the principal’s bene-
fit from her privacy in a common-value environment with an uninformed agent,
and presents the principal’s optimal information structure. In a common-value
environment with an uninformed agent, Balkenborg and Makris (2015) introduce
the concept of “assured mechanism” and show that the mechanism is a neutral
optimum under certain conditions. Balestrieri and Izmalkov (2016) characterize a
seller’s ex ante optimal mechanism in a Hotelling model with common values.
Among previous studies on bilateral trading, Yilankaya (1999), Mylovanov and
Tro¨ger (2014), and Koessler and Skreta (2016) are notable exceptions that analyze
models in which the trading mechanism is endogenously designed by an informed
trader. The former two studies consider independent private-value environments.
Yilankaya (1999) shows that the equilibrium interim payoff vector for the seller is
uniquely determined by the full-information payoff vector. Mylovanov and Tro¨ger
(2014) analyze a partnership-dissolution model a` la Cramton et al. (1987) as an
7See Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2014) for a more detailed literature review. In addition, see
Wagner et al. (2015) for studies on informed principal problems with moral hazard.
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application of their general results. Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2014) characterize
a unique ex ante optimal allocation, in which all types of principal (except one
type) strictly benefit from the privacy of her information. Koessler and Skreta
(2016) analyze an independent-type environment in which either trader privately
knows a type that affects only the buyer’s valuation (i.e., the seller’s valuation
is always zero). In their environment, the type spaces and the buyer’s valuation
function are more general than ours. Koessler and Skreta (2016) characterize the
set of equilibrium allocations and show that the seller as a principal may benefit
from the privacy of her information in an ex ante optimal equilibrium. This paper
contributes to the literature by making a clear prediction about equilibrium allo-
cations and showing that the privacy of the seller’s information is rather harmful
to both parties in our environment with interdependent values.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating
example. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 gives the refinement analyses
based on the intuitive criterion and D1. Section 5 investigates the properties of
RSW allocations. Section 6 explores the relationships among the refinement crite-
ria. Section 7 concludes. Appendix provides proofs and Supplementary Material
presents some examples.
2 Motivating example
A seller wishes to sell a used car to a buyer. Both parties are risk neutral. The
seller privately knows the quality x ∈ {1, 2} of her car and the buyer the frequency
y ∈ {1, 2} of his use. The types x, y are independently and uniformly distributed.
The seller’s valuation for the car is 100x and the buyer’s is 100(x + y). Thus, it
is always ex post efficient to allocate the car to the buyer. If x were commonly
known, then it would be optimal for the seller to sell her car at price 100(x + 1).
On the other hand, the fixed prices are infeasible for the informed seller because
the low-quality seller pretends to be of high type.
The informed seller, however, can select an RSW allocation. An RSW allo-
cation in this example is given by Table 1, where the left element in each cell
is a probability that the car is transferred to the buyer and the right one a sure
payment to the seller. The RSW allocation yields the interim payoff 200 to the
low-quality seller and (0 + 200)/2 + (800/3 + 200 · 1/3)/2 = 800/3 to the high-
6
quality seller. Hence, the seller’s privacy is irrelevant to her if quality is low but
damages her if it is high. The high-quality seller signals the true quality by re-
ducing trading probabilities so that the low-quality seller is indifferent between
truth-telling and lying.
frequency
y = 1 y = 2
quality
x = 1 1, 200
x = 2 0, 0 2/3, 800/3
Table 1: RSW allocation
There are two issues concerning the RSW allocation. First, it is not clear
whether the allocation can be selected in any equilibrium of the mechanism-
selection game.8 One might expect that the “worst posterior beliefs” (i.e., the
buyer believes that quality is certainly low after any mechanism different from
the RSW allocation is offered) can prevent the seller’s deviation from the RSW
allocation. Actually, we could prove the existence of an equilibrium by using the
worst posterior beliefs if the seller’s valuation were always zero, as in Koessler and
Skreta (2016). The extreme beliefs, however, cannot support the RSW allocation
in our environment, where the seller’s valuation depends on her type. Consider
the following new mechanism with δ ∈ (0, 50/3), where the buyer is inactive and
the seller chooses between “fixed price” and “fee with no delivery.”
Seller’s options
fixed price (a) 1, 200− δ
fee with no delivery (b) 0, 200/3 + δ
As shown by the truncated game tree in Figure 2, the high-quality seller devi-
ates from the RSW allocation because the buyer with the worst posterior belief
certainly accepts the new mechanism.
Second, even if the RSW allocation is selected in equilibrium, there may be
other equilibrium allocations. Theorem 1 in Section 4 implies that any feasible
allocation that weakly dominates RSW allocations is an equilibrium allocation.
In fact, it is shown that the red triangle in the left graph of Figure 3 is the set of
the seller’s equilibrium interim payoff vectors in this example.9 The RSW payoff
vector is the minimum element of the set. The blue dotted line denotes the iso-(ex
8The equilibrium concept is a strong version of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
9The set is characterized in Section B.1 of the Supplementary Material.
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RSW RSW new
a ab b
reject accept reject accept
Nature
SellerSeller
BuyerBuyer
SellerSeller
new
Figure 2: Truncated game tree
ante) payoff line through the full-information payoff vector, which is defined as
the optimal payoff vector for the seller whose type is commonly known.
In this example, both D1 and the intuitive criterion select the RSW payoff
vector as a unique prediction about the seller’s payoff vector. If the seller’s valu-
ation is zero (and the buyer’s valuation is the same as before), then the set of the
seller’s equilibrium payoff vectors is given by the red 45◦ line segment in the right
graph of Figure 3, as characterized by Koessler and Skreta (2016). In that case,
however, neither the intuitive criterion nor D1 has bite. If the seller’s valuation is
perturbed so that it is monotonic in her type, then either criterion again selects
the RSW payoff vector.
Figure 3: Seller’s interim expected payoff vectors
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3 The model
3.1 Setup
Consider a seller (principal) who wishes to sell an indivisible good to a buyer
(agent). The traders are indexed by i = 1, 2 respectively. The seller’s and buyer’s
one-dimensional types are given by x ∈ X := {1, 2, ..., x¯} and y ∈ Y := {1, 2, ..., y¯}
respectively. The types are independent random variables distributed according
to probability distributions p1 ∈ ∆(X) and p2 ∈ ∆(Y ) with full support.10 Trader
i’s valuation for the good is additively separable in (x, y) and denoted by v1i (x) +
v2i (y) ∈ R+, where vii is strictly increasing and vji is increasing for each i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with i 6= j.11 Hence, the valuations can be private. Denote by q ∈ [0, 1] a
probability that the good is transferred and by t ∈ R a payment from the buyer
to the seller. We call (q, t) ∈ [0, 1]×R an outcome and (q, t) = (0, 0) the no-trade
outcome. Given any type profile (x, y) and outcome (q, t), the seller’s and buyer’s
ex post payoffs are t+ (v11(x) + v
2
1(y))(1− q) and (v12(x) + v22(y))q− t respectively.
We define a mechanism G = 〈S1, S2, q, t〉 as a finite strategic game form be-
tween the two players. Each set Si is a finite set of actions for player i, and
the pair (q, t) is an outcome function, where q ∈ [0, 1]S1×S2 is an allocation rule
and t ∈ RS1×S2 is a payment rule.12 Let G be the set of all mechanisms. Notice
that G includes a direct mechanism g = (q, t), whose action sets are S1 = X and
S2 = Y .
13 The set G also includes a menu defined as a mechanism in which the
seller is inactive (i.e., S1 = ∅).
The mechanism-selection game is a dynamic Bayesian game that proceeds as
follows. First, a type profile (x, y) is realized according to (p1, p2). Each player is
privately informed about her or his own type. Second, the seller offers a mechanism
G = 〈S1, S2, q, t〉 ∈ G to the buyer, who either accepts or rejects it. If the buyer
rejects G, then the game ends with the no-trade outcome. If the buyer accepts G,
then both players simultaneously and independently choose their actions (s1, s2) ∈
S1 × S2 and the game ends with the outcome (q(s1, s2), t(s1, s2)). Each player
obtains her or his ex post payoff yielded by the outcome with the realized types.
The rule of the mechanism-selection game is common knowledge.
The solution concept applied to the mechanism-selection game is the strong
10For any finite set A, let ∆(A) be the set of all probability distributions on A.
11The additive separability is essential for our refinement analysis, which relies on the interim
payoff equivalence of Lemma 6. The working paper version of this paper allows non-additively
separable valuations and proves the existence of a separating equilibrium (Nishimura, 2017).
12For any two nonempty sets A and B, let BA be the set of all functions that map A into B.
13To simplify the notation, we identify a direct mechanism with outcome function (q, t).
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version of perfect Bayesian equilibrium adopted by Maskin and Tirole (1992). The
concept would be equivalent to sequential equilibrium if the set G of mechanisms
were finite (i.e., the mechanism-selection game were finite). Formally, an equi-
librium of the game is an assessment (γ, σ, pi) that is sequentially rational and
consistent, where (γ, σ) = (γ1, (γ
G
2 , σ
G
1 , σ
G
2 )G∈G) is a profile of behavioral strategies
and pi = (piG1 , pi
G
2 )G∈G is a system of beliefs. Here, γ1 = (γ1(x))x∈X represents
the seller’s mechanism-selection plan, where γ1(x) is a probability measure on G
endowed with some sigma-algebra. For any mechanism G ∈ G, γG2 (y) is the prob-
ability with which the buyer of type y accepts G, and σG1 (s1 | x) and σG2 (s2 | y)
are the probabilities with which the seller of x and the buyer of y choose actions
s1, s2 in G respectively. Also, pi
G
2 ∈ ∆(Y ) is the seller’s posterior belief about y
after G is accepted, and piG1 ∈ ∆(X) is the buyer’s posterior belief about x after
G is offered.14 Notice that the consistency already requires the buyer’s posterior
belief piG1 about x to remain unchanged after the seller offers G. The consistency
also implies that each player’s posterior belief piGi is independent of his or her type
because the priors (p1, p2) are independent. Any equilibrium (γ, σ, pi) induces the
equilibrium allocation g = (q, t) defined by
q(x, y) :=
∫
G=〈S1,S2,q˜,t˜〉∈G
γG2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σG1 (s1 | x)σG2 (s2 | y)q˜(s1, s2)dγ1(x), (1)
t(x, y) :=
∫
G=〈S1,S2,q˜,t˜〉∈G
γG2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σG1 (s1 | x)σG2 (s2 | y)t˜(s1, s2)dγ1(x). (2)
We introduce additional notation and concepts. We first define the players’
payoffs from reporting their types in a direct mechanism g = (q, t) as follows. Let
U g1 (xˆ | x) := Ey
[
t(xˆ, y) +
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
(1− q(xˆ, y))] (3)
be the seller’s interim payoff from reporting xˆ ∈ X given her type x,
ug2(yˆ | x, y) :=
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
q(x, yˆ)− t(x, yˆ) (4)
be the buyer’s ex post payoff from reporting yˆ ∈ Y given a type profile (x, y), and
U g2 (yˆ | y, pi1) := Epi1x [ug2(yˆ | x, y)] =
∑
x∈X
pi1(x)u
g
2(yˆ | x, y) (5)
14Strictly speaking, the buyer’s belief when he chooses an action s2 in the simultaneous-move
game G is an element of ∆(X×S1). However, the consistency requires the buyer to believe that
(x, s1) occurs with probability pi
G
1 (x)σ
G
1 (s1 | x).
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be the buyer’s expected payoff from reporting yˆ ∈ Y given his type y and his
belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X) respectively, provided that the other player tells the truth. The
expectation Ey is taken with respect to the prior p2, but E
pi1
x with respect to
pi1, which may be different from the prior p1. Denote by U
g
1 (x) := U
g
1 (x | x),
ug2(x, y) := u
g
2(y | x, y), U g2 (y, pi1) := U g2 (y | y, pi1) and U g2 (y) := U g2 (y, p1) the
players’ payoffs when both players adopt the truth-telling strategies in g.
A direct mechanism is also called an allocation (that occurs through interac-
tions between the players). We now define some kinds of IC and IR conditions.
Definition 1. Let g be an allocation and pi1 ∈ ∆(X) be the buyer’s belief.
(i) g is BIC for the seller if U g1 (x) ≥ U g1 (xˆ | x) for any x, xˆ ∈ X.
(ii) g is IIR for the seller if U g1 (x) ≥ v11(x) + Ey[v21(y)] for any x ∈ X.
(iii) g is BIC for the buyer with pi1 if U
g
2 (y, pi1) ≥ U g2 (yˆ | y, pi1) for any y, yˆ ∈ Y .
(iv) g is IIR for the buyer with pi1 if U
g
2 (y, pi1) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ Y .
(v) g is EPIC for the buyer if ug2(x, y) ≥ ug2(yˆ | x, y) for any x ∈ X, y, yˆ ∈ Y .
(vi) g is EPIR for the buyer if ug2(x, y) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
(vii) g is pi1-feasible if g is both BIC and IIR for the seller and the buyer with pi1.
(viii) g is feasible if g is p1-feasible.
Following Myerson (1983), we introduce the dominance relations for the seller
between allocations.
Definition 2. An allocation g′ weakly dominates another one g if U g
′
1 (x) ≥ U g1 (x)
for each x. An allocation g′ dominates another one g if U g
′
1 (x) ≥ U g1 (x) for each
x and U g
′
1 (x) > U
g
1 (x) for some x. A feasible allocation g is undominated given
pi1 ∈ ∆(X) if g is not dominated by any pi1-feasible allocation. Put simply, a
feasible allocation g is undominated if it is undominated given p1.
Finally, we introduce an allocation that plays a central role in the analysis.
Definition 3. An allocation g∗ = (q∗, t∗) is a Rothschild–Stiglitz–Wilson (RSW)
allocation if it is a solution to the following problem for each x ∈ X:
max
g∈([0,1]×R)X×Y
U g1 (x) (6)
s.t. g is BIC for the seller.
g is EPIC for the buyer.
g is EPIR for the buyer.
That is, the RSW allocation is the best feasible allocation for all types of seller
among those that are IC and IR for the buyer even if the seller’s type is commonly
11
known. It is easy to verify that there is at least one RSW allocation. Although
multiple RSW allocations might exist, the (seller’s) RSW payoff vector U g
∗
1 is
unique among all RSW allocations. Since the no-trade mechanism is feasible in
problem (6), any RSW allocation is IIR for the seller.
3.2 Refinement concepts
Following Cho and Kreps (1987), we refine equilibria in the mechanism-selection
game. For any mechanism G ∈ G and any posterior pi1 ∈ ∆(X), let BR(pi1, G) be
the set of sequential equilibrium allocations g′ = (q′, t′) in the continuation game
given (pi1, G).
15 If G is a menu, then BR(pi1, G) is simply the set of allocations
induced by mixed best responses (γG2 , σ
G
2 ) to G for the the buyer with pi1. Denote
BR(G) := ∪pi1∈∆(X)BR(pi1, G). Given an equilibrium allocation g, we define the
following two sets for any x ∈ X, G ∈ G:
D(x,G) :=
{
g′ ∈ BR(G) | U g′1 (x) > U g1 (x)
}
(7)
D0(x,G) :=
{
g′ ∈ BR(G) | U g′1 (x) = U g1 (x)
}
(8)
We now establish two refinement criteria. Fix any equilibrium (γ, σ, pi) with
an equilibrium allocation g. First, let X(G) be the set of all types x such that
D(x,G) ∪D0(x,G) = ∅, (9)
for mechanism G ∈ G. Condition (9) means that type x has no incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium to G for any posterior pi1 and any sequential equilibrium given
(pi1, G). The equilibrium (γ, σ, pi) (or the allocation g) is said to pass the intuitive
criterion if there is no mechanism G such that some type x′ ∈ X \X(G) receives
U g
′
1 (x
′) > U g1 (x
′) for any pi1 ∈ ∆(X \X(G)) and any g′ ∈ BR(pi1, G). Second, the
equilibrium (γ, σ, pi) (or the allocation g) is said to pass (criterion) D1 if, for any
mechanism G, piG1 (x) = 0 whenever there is another type x
′ 6= x such that
D(x,G) ∪D0(x,G) ( D(x′, G). (10)
The set inclusion means that if type x has a weak incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium to G, then type x′ has a strong incentive to do so. We define a D1
equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game as an equilibrium that passes D1.
15That is, (q′(x, y), t′(x, y)) := γG2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2 σ
G
1 (s1 | x)σG2 (s2 | y)(q(s1, s2), t(s1, s2)),
where (γG2 , σ
G
1 , σ
G
2 ) is a sequential equilibrium strategy profile in the continuation game.
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It is clear that if an equilibrium passes D1, then it passes the intuitive criterion.
We also introduce other refinement concepts in Section 6.
4 Refined equilibrium
In this section, we show that the mechanism-selection game has a D1 equilibrium
in which the seller makes a pooling offer of an RSW allocation. We then prove
that the players’ interim payoff vectors in any D1 equilibrium are determined by
those in some RSW allocation. The latter result holds true even if the refinement
concept is weakened to the intuitive criterion, provided that the seller’s type is
binary or her valuation is private.
4.1 Existence
We first prove that any RSW allocation is selected by the seller in a D1 equilibrium
Theorem 1. Let g∗ be an RSW allocation. The mechanism-selection game has a
D1 equilibrium where the seller always offers g∗ and the buyer always accepts g∗.
Theorem 1 is based on the following important fact.
Proposition 1. Suppose that an RSW allocation g∗ is undominated given some
belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X). Then the mechanism-selection game has a D1 equilibrium where
the seller always offers g∗ and the buyer always accepts g∗.
The proof consists of three steps. Fix any mechanism G 6= g∗. First, we define
an auxiliary mechanism-selection game in which (x, y) are realized according to
(pi1, p2) and the seller can select either g
∗ or G. We also define a sequence of
perturbed games converging to the auxiliary game. The sequence is taken so
that if x, x′ satisfy condition (10), then the minimum possible probability with
which type x chooses G is sufficiently lower than that for x′. Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem then ensures that there is a convergent sequence (γk, σk, pik)∞k=1
with (γG, σG, piG) := limk→∞(γk, σk, pik) such that each strategy profile (γk, σk) is
a Nash equilibrium of the k-th perturbed game and each belief pair pik = (pik1 , pi
k
2)
is derived from Bayes’ rule. Second, we show that the continuation strategy profile
(γG2 , σ
G
1 , σ
G
2 ) prevents the seller deviating from g
∗ to G. In this step, we invoke the
hypothesis in Proposition 1. Finally, by using the off-the-path actions (γG2 , σ
G
1 , σ
G
2 )
and beliefs (piG1 , pi
G
2 ) for anyG 6= g∗, we prove that the original mechanism-selection
game has a D1 equilibrium in which the seller offers g∗ and the buyer accepts it.
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Remark 1. The proof for Proposition 1 is based on that for Theorem 1 of Maskin
and Tirole (1992). We extend their proof, however, so that the equilibrium passes
D1. Our proof method also dispenses with their requirement that pi1 should have
full support.
Our goal is now to prove that the hypothesis in Proposition 1 is true. The
proof proceeds in the following critical steps. We first observe that g∗ is an RSW
allocation if and only if g∗ is a solution to the following single problem:
max
g∈([0,1]×R)X×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (11)
s.t. g is BIC for the seller.
g is EPIC for the buyer.
g is EPIR for the buyer.
In fact, the same equivalence holds even if the objective functional in (11) is
replaced by
∑
x∈X w(x)U
g
1 (x) provided w ∈ RX++.16
For any allocation rule q and any belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X) for the buyer, we call the
functions Q1(·) := Ey [q(·, y)] ∈ [0, 1]X and Qpi12 (·) := Epi1x [q(x, ·)] ∈ [0, 1]Y the
interim allocation rules for the seller and the buyer with pi1 respectively, following
Gershkov et al. (2013). The next lemma is a simple and well-known result.
Lemma 1. Let (q, t) be an allocation and pi1 ∈ ∆(X) be the buyer’s belief.
(i) If (q, t) is EPIC for the buyer, then q(x, ·) is increasing in y for all x.
(ii) If (q, t) is BIC for the buyer with pi1, then Q
pi1
2 is increasing in y.
(iii) If (q, t) is BIC for the seller, then Q1 is decreasing in x.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 implies that if (q, t) is feasible in problem (11), then each
function q(x, ·) is an element of the following set of functions on Y :
Q := {q ∈ [0, 1]Y | q is increasing in y} (12)
16The “only if” part is straightforward by definition of the RSW allocation. The “if” part
follows from the fact that an RSW allocation g∗ weakly dominates any allocation g that satisfies
the constraints in (11); in other words, the RSW payoff vector Ug
∗
1 is the maximum element in
the set {Ug1 ∈ RX | g satisfies the constraints in (11)}.
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By using the observation, we define a less-constrained problem than (11):
max
g=(q,t)∈QX×RX×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (13)
s.t. U g1 (x) ≥ U g1 (x+ 1 | x) for any x < x¯.
ug2(x, y) ≥ ug2(y − 1 | x, y) for any x ∈ X, y > 1.
ug2(x, 1) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X.
Although the set of allocation rules is restricted to QX in this problem, the same
restriction is applied to problem (11) by part (i) of Lemma 1. In (13), the seller’s
BICs are weakened to the local upward ones, the buyer’s EPICs are weakened
to the local downward ones, and the buyer’s EPIR constraints are imposed only
at the bottom. We will see later that any solution to (13) satisfies all of the
constraints in (11), and thus g∗ is an RSW allocation if and only if g∗ is a solution
to (13).
Problem (13) is a linear programming problem that is feasible and bounded
from above. We denote by κ ∈ RX\{x¯}+ , λ ∈ RX×Y+ the vectors of Lagrange multipli-
ers associated with the seller’s local upward BICs and the buyer’s local downward
EPICs and EPIR at the bottom respectively. We now define Lagrangian function
L for (13) as follows:
L(g, κ, λ) := Ex [U
g
1 (x)] +
x¯−1∑
x=1
κ(x) [U g1 (x)− U g1 (x+ 1 | x)] (14)
+
∑
x∈X
y¯∑
y=2
λ(x, y) [ug2(x, y)− ug2(y − 1 | x, y)] +
∑
x∈X
λ(x, 1)ug2(x, 1)
The domain QX × RX×Y of the objective functional in problem (13) is a convex
subset of R2|X×Y |. Also, there is an allocation (q, t) ∈ QX × RX×Y that satisfies
all constraints in (13) with strict inequality. The functionals U g1 (x), U
g
1 (x+ 1 | x),
ug2(x, y) and u
g
2(y−1 | x, y) in (13) are linear on the domain QX×RX×Y . Thus, by
using Corollary 1 in Section 8.3 of Luenberger (1969), we obtain vectors (κ∗, λ∗) ∈
RX\{x¯}+ ×RX×Y+ of nonnegative numbers such that the Lagrangian L has a saddle
point at (q∗, t∗), (κ∗, λ∗), that is,
L(q, t, κ∗, λ∗) ≤ L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) ≤ L(q∗, t∗, κ, λ) (15)
for all (q, t) ∈ QX × RX×Y , (κ, λ) ∈ RX\{x¯}+ × RX×Y+ .
For notational simplicity, we denote by ψ(x) + φ(y) the social surplus for each
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type profile (x, y), where ψ(x) := v12(x)− v11(x) and φ(y) := v22(y)− v21(y). Denote
by dv1(x) := v
1
1(x) − v11(x − 1) and dv2(y) := v22(y + 1) − v22(y) the differences
between the valuations of two adjacent types, where dv1(1) = dv2(y¯) = 0. We
define the distribution function P2 on Y by P2(y) :=
∑y
y′=1 p2(y
′) with P2(0) = 0.
Some remarkable properties of the solution to (13) are given by the next lemma.
Lemma 2. Let g∗ = (q∗, t∗) be a solution to problem (13) and (κ∗, λ∗) ∈ RX\{x¯}+ ×
RX×Y+ be a vector of nonnegative numbers such that the profile (q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) sat-
isfies saddle-point condition (15). Then the following hold:
(i) λ∗(x, y) = pi1(x)(1−P2(y− 1)) for each x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , where pi1 ∈ ∆(X) is the
buyer’s belief defined by pi1(x) := p1(x)+κ
∗(x)−κ∗(x−1) with κ∗(0) = κ∗(x¯) = 0.
(ii) Each function q∗(x, ·) on Y is a solution to the following problem:
max
q∈Q
∑
y∈Y
p2(y)
[
pi1(x)
(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
− κ∗(x− 1)dv1(x)
]
q(y)
(iii) ug
∗
2 (x, y) = u
g∗
2 (y − 1 | x, y) and ug
∗
2 (x, 1) = 0 for each x ∈ X, y > 1.
(iv) (q∗, t∗) is both EPIC and EPIR for the buyer.
(v) (q∗, t∗) is both BIC and IIR for the seller.
(vi) (q∗, t∗) is undominated given the buyer’s belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X) defined in part (i).
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 shows that each type x of seller chooses trading prob-
abilities q(x, ·) ∈ Q so as to maximize not the expected virtual surplus but the
reduced surplus unless she has the lowest type x = 1 or the downward adjacent
type x− 1 has no incentive to pretend to be x (i.e., κ∗(x− 1) = 0). The trading
surplus for x is reduced by not only the information rents to the buyer but also
signaling costs to the seller herself.
We finally reach the last step. Parts (iv) and (v) of Lemma 2 imply that g∗ is
an RSW allocation if and only if g∗ is a solution to problem (13). Therefore, we
can prove Theorem 1 by using Proposition 1 with part (vi) of Lemma 2.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that there is a D1 equilibrium in which
each type x of seller offers not the mechanism g∗ but the menu (q∗(x, ·), t∗(x, ·)).
Since the RSW allocation is BIC for the seller, the seller’s interim allocation rule
Q∗1 = Ey [q
∗(·, y)] is decreasing in x by part (iii) of Lemma 1. If Q∗1 is strictly
decreasing in x, then the D1 equilibrium is fully separating. If Q∗1(x) = 0 for some
x < x¯, then q∗(x′, ·) = t∗(x′, ·) ≡ 0 for all x′ ≥ x and thus some pooling occurs as
in the signaling model with a bounded signal space of Cho and Sobel (1990).
Lemma 2 ensures that any RSW allocation is undominated given some poste-
rior pi1 for the buyer. On the other hand, as emphasized by Myerson (1983), there
16
might be no strong solution, which is defined in our model as an RSW allocation
that is undominated given the prior p1. One such example is given as follows.
Example 1. Assume that X = Y = {1, 2}, v11(x) + v21(y) = x+ 3y, v12(x) + v22(y) =
6x + y, and p1 = p2 ≡ 1/2. Then the unique RSW allocation (q∗, t∗) is given by
q∗(1, ·) ≡ 1, t∗(1, ·) ≡ 7, q∗(2, ·) ≡ 1/5 and t∗(2, ·) ≡ 13/5. The RSW allocation is
dominated by the feasible allocation (q∗∗, t∗∗) with q∗∗ ≡ 1 and t∗∗ ≡ 10.
4.2 Uniqueness
We next prove the uniqueness of the D1 equilibrium payoff vector for the seller.
Theorem 2. Fix any equilibrium allocation g˜ that passes D1. The seller’s interim
payoff vector U g˜1 is uniquely determined by the RSW payoff vector.
Let g˜ and g∗ be D1 equilibrium and RSW allocations respectively. To derive a
contradiction, we consider two cases here. First, assume that U g˜1 (x) < U
g∗
1 (x) for
some x. Then the seller of the lowest type x′ among those with U g˜1 (x) < U
g∗
1 (x)
would have an incentive to offer a menu close to the RSW menu (q∗(x′, ·), t∗(x′, ·))
because the offer would persuade the buyer that the seller’s type is no lower than
x′ by criterion D1. Second, assume that U g˜1 (x) > U
g∗
1 (x) for some x. This case
is essential in the proof. Here, we use the interim payoff equivalence provided by
Lemma 6 in the Appendix. The lemma implies that, for any feasible allocation,
there is another feasible allocation that is EPIC for the buyer and interim-payoff-
equivalent to the original allocation for both players. We prove the lemma by
extending Theorem 2 of Gershkov et al. (2013) to our environment with interde-
pendent values, in which the principal has private information. The lemma allows
us to assume that the equilibrium allocation g˜ is EPIC for the buyer.
The uniqueness result in Theorem 2 holds true even if the refinement concept
is weakened to the intuitive criterion, provided that the seller’s type is binary or
her valuation is private.
Theorem 3. Fix any equilibrium allocation g˜ that passes the intuitive criterion.
The seller’s interim payoff vector U g˜1 is uniquely determined by the RSW payoff
vector if X = {1, 2} or v21(y) = 0 for any y.
Cho and Kreps (1987) show that, in the Spence signaling game, if a sender has
more than two types, then the intuitive criterion may no longer yield the unique
payoff vector to the sender. In the mechanism-selection game, however, the signal
space is so rich that the criterion is more powerful. In fact, if the seller has more
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than two types but her valuation is private, then any allocation that does not
yield the RWS payoff vector causes some type x′ to deviate to another allocation
where truth-telling is a strictly dominant action for any x > x′. It remains an
open question whether we can drop the assumption in Theorem 3 or not.
Finally, the following theorem shows that if an equilibrium yields the seller the
RSW payoff vector, then the buyer’s interim payoff vector in the equilibrium is
given by some RSW allocation.
Theorem 4. Let g˜ be an equilibrium allocation such that U g˜1 is the seller’s RSW
payoff vector. Then there is an RSW allocation g∗ with U g˜2 = U
g∗
2 .
5 Properties of RSW allocations
Theorems 1–4 provide us a strong motivation to investigate the properties of RSW
allocations. We now tackle the problem.
5.1 Allocative consequences
Consider a hypothetical situation in which the seller’s realized type x is common
knowledge, although the buyer’s realized type y is still his private information.
We define the following allocation as in Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992).
Definition 4. An allocation g¯ = (q¯, t¯) is a full-information allocation if each menu
(q¯(x, ·), t¯(x, ·)) is a solution to the following problem:
max
(q,t)∈[0,1]Y ×RY
Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
(1− q(y))] (16)
s.t.
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
(q(y)− q(yˆ)) ≥ t(y)− t(yˆ) for each y, yˆ ∈ Y.(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
q(y)− t(y) ≥ 0 for each y ∈ Y.
We also define two simple menus as follows.
Definition 5. A menu (q, t) ∈ [0, 1]Y × RY is a fixed price if there is a number
τ ∈ R+ with a threshold yˆ ∈ R such that (i) q(y) = 1 and t(y) = τ if y ≥ yˆ and
(ii) q(y) = t(y) = 0 if y < yˆ.
Definition 6. A menu (q, t) ∈ [0, 1]Y × RY is an almost-fixed price if there is a
number τ ∈ R+ with a threshold yˆ ∈ Y such that (i) q(y) = 1 and t(y) = τ if
y > yˆ and (ii) q(y) = t(y) = 0 if y < yˆ.
The full-information allocation can be implemented by a set of fixed prices such
that the allocation rule is the maximum among all full-information allocation rules.
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We prove the result by taking the elegant approach of Manelli and Vincent (2007);
see also Bo¨rgers et al. (2015).
Lemma 3. There is a full-information allocation g¯ = (q¯, t¯) such that each menu
(q¯(x, ·), t¯(x, ·)) is a fixed price with a threshold y¯(x) that satisfies (i) q¯(x, y) = 1
and t¯(x, y) = v12(x) + v
2
2(y¯(x)) if y ≥ y¯(x), (ii) q¯(x, y) = t¯(x, y) = 0 if y < y¯(x),
and (iii) q¯(x, ·) ≥ q(x, ·) on Y for any full-information allocation (q, t).
We now show that any RSW allocation is a set of almost-fixed prices under the
regularity assumption that the virtual surplus ψ(x)+φ(y)−dv2(y)(1−P2(y))/p2(y)
is strictly increasing in the buyer’s type y. In Example 1, the regularity assumption
is violated and thus the RSW allocation no longer takes the format.
Theorem 5. Assume that φ−dv2(1−P2)/p2 is strictly increasing in y. Let (q∗, t∗)
be an RSW allocation. Then each menu (q∗(x, ·), t∗(x, ·)) is an almost-fixed price.
We compare the allocative consequences of the RSW and full-information al-
locations. The following theorem shows that any RSW allocation rule is distorted
downward from the full-information allocation rule in Lemma 3.
Theorem 6. Let (q∗, t∗) be an RSW allocation and (q¯, t¯) be the full-information
allocation given by Lemma 3. Then q∗(x, y) ≤ q¯(x, y) for each type profile (x, y).
We define the efficient allocation rule as the function q ∈ [0, 1]X×Y such that
q(x, y) =
1 if ψ(x) + φ(y) ≥ 00 otherwise (17)
for each type profile (x, y), where ψ(x) + φ(y) = (v12(x)− v11(x)) + (v22(y)− v21(y))
is the social surplus. The next proposition shows that if the buyer’s type variable
has stronger effects on his valuation than on the seller’s valuation and thus the
efficient allocation rule is increasing in y, then any full-information allocation rule
q¯ entails undersupply of the good compared with the efficient one.
Proposition 2. Let (q¯, t¯) be a full-information allocation and denote by q the
efficient allocation rule. Suppose that φ = v22 − v21 is increasing in y. Then
q¯(x, y) ≤ q(x, y) for each type profile (x, y).
By Theorem 6, any RSW allocation rule q∗ entails more severe undersupply
than the rule q¯ in Lemma 3 does. An example is given as follows.
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Example 2. Assume that X = Y = {1, 2, ..., 25}, v11(x)+v21(y) = x, v12(x)+v22(y) =
3x+y, and p1 = p2 ≡ 1/25. It is ex post efficient to allocate the good to the buyer
for any (x, y). Any fixed-price mechanism such that q ≡ 1 and t ≡ τ ∈ [25, 40] is
feasible and implements the efficient trade. The unique full-information allocation
(q¯, t¯) is a set of fixed prices such that q¯(x, y) = 1, t¯(x, y) = 2x+13 if y ≥ 13−x, and
q¯(x, y) = t¯(x, y) = 0 if y < 13− x. Since the virtual surplus is strictly increasing
in y, the RSW allocation is a set of almost-fixed prices. Nishimura (2017) shows
that if the type spaces are closed intervals, then the thresholds of the almost-fixed
prices are given by the unique solution to a differential equation with an initial
value. In the left graph of Figure 4, the RSW (full-information) allocation assigns
the good to the buyer above the red (blue) dots and to the seller below them.
In the gray region, the RSW allocation entails more severe undersupply than the
full-information allocation does.
If the lowest type seller retains the good in any full-information allocation,
then the seller always does so in any RSW allocation. The next example shows
that the privacy of the seller’s information causes the disappearance of the market.
Example 3. Assume that X = Y = {1, 2, ..., 25}, v11(x) + v21(y) = x + 28, v12(x) +
v22(y) = 3x+ y, and p1 = p2 ≡ 1/25. It is ex post efficient to allocate the good to
the buyer if y ≥ 28−2x and to the seller if y < 28−2x. The unique full-information
allocation (q¯, t¯) is a set of fixed prices such that q¯(x, y) = 1, t¯(x, y) = 2x + 27 if
y ≥ 27 − x and q¯(x, y) = t¯(x, y) = 0 if y < 27 − x. In the right graph of Figure
4, the blue dots represent the thresholds y¯(x) = 27 − x for the full-information
allocation rule. Since q¯(1, ·) ≡ 0, Theorem 6 and part (iii) of Lemma 1 imply that
there is no trade in any RSW allocation.
5.2 Distributional consequences
Furthermore, we investigate the distributional consequences of RSW allocations.
Any RSW allocation g∗ is weakly dominated by any full-information allocation
g¯ because signaling costs cause the downward distortion of q∗(x, ·) unless type x
has the minimal effect on the buyer’s valuation (i.e., v12(x) = v
1
2(1)) or the seller’s
local upward BIC is nonbinding. The result is summarized as follows.
Theorem 7. Let g∗ and g¯ be RSW and full-information allocations respectively.
Then U g
∗
1 (x) = U
g¯
1 (x) if v
1
2(x) = v
1
2(1), and U
g∗
1 (x) ≤ U g¯1 (x) if v12(x) > v12(1). In
particular, U g
∗
1 = U
g¯
1 if the buyer’s valuation is private (i.e., v
1
2 ≡ 0).
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Figure 4: Ex post allocations of the good in Examples 2 and 3
The same dominance relationship as Theorem 7 is satisfied for the buyer’s
ex post payoffs, given the full-information allocation in Lemma 3. Therefore, we
conclude that the privacy of the seller’s information reduces not only the seller’s
interim payoffs but also the buyer’s ex post payoffs.
Theorem 8. Let g∗ be an RSW allocation and g¯ the full-information allocation
given by Lemma 3. Then ug
∗
2 (x, y) ≤ ug¯2(x, y) for each type profile (x, y).
We now define an ex ante optimal allocation g∗∗ for the seller as a solution to
the following problem:
max
g∈([0,1]×R)X×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (18)
s.t. g is BIC for the seller.
g is BIC for the buyer with p1.
g is IIR for the buyer with p1.
If the seller can make a non-retractable offer before she learns her type, then
a natural candidate selected by the seller is an ex ante optimal allocation. For
instance, the mechanism (q∗∗, t∗∗) in Example 1 is an ex ante optimal allocation.
We show that the seller’s ex ante payoffs in RSW, ex ante optimal and full-
information allocations are ranked as follows.
Theorem 9. Let g∗, g∗∗ and g¯ = (q¯, t¯) be RSW, ex ante optimal and full-
information allocations respectively. Then the following hold:
(i) Ex[U
g∗
1 (x)] ≤ Ex[U g
∗∗
1 (x)] ≤ Ex[U g¯1 (x)].
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(ii) Ex[U
g∗∗
1 (x)] = Ex[U
g¯
1 (x)] if Q¯1(·) = Ey[q¯(·, y)] is decreasing in x.
Part (i) implies that, in any equilibrium (that may fail D1 or the intuitive
criterion), the seller cannot obtain a higher ex ante payoff than that in the full-
information allocation. Part (ii) also implies that if the seller’s interim allocation
rule Q¯1 is decreasing in x, then the privacy of the seller’s information is irrelevant
to her ex ante payoffs if she can commit to a mechanism offer in the ex ante stage.
The next proposition presents a sufficient condition for the hypothesis in (ii)
of Theorem 9 to be true. The sufficient condition states that the seller’s type
variable has stronger effects on her valuation than on the buyer’s valuation.
Proposition 3. Let (q¯, t¯) be the full-information allocation given by Lemma 3. If
ψ = v12 − v11 is decreasing in x, then Q¯1(·) = Ey[q¯(·, y)] is decreasing in x.
Remark 2. If an additional constraint that g∗∗ is IIR for the seller is imposed on
the ex ante optimal allocation in problem (18), then the equation Ex[U
g∗∗
1 (x)] =
Ex[U
g¯
1 (x)] in part (ii) of Theorem 9 may no longer be satisfied. On the other hand,
even if the seller’s IIR constraints are imposed on the ex ante optimal allocation,
we can obtain the same ranking as part (i) of the theorem.
6 Ohter refinement concepts
This section introduces refinement concepts (or solution concepts) other than the
intuitive criterion and D1, and explores the relationships among the concepts.
The first concept is developed by Myerson (1983). An allocation g is a core
mechanism if (i) g is feasible and (ii) there is no allocation g′ such that Z := {x ∈
X | U g′1 (x) > U g1 (x)} 6= ∅ and, for every set Z ′ that satisfies Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ X, g′
is pi1-feasible for pi1 := p1/
∑
x∈Z′ p1(x) ∈ ∆(Z ′). The set Z of types can be seen
as a “blocking coalition.” It is easy to see that any core mechanism g is weakly
undominated (i.e., there is no feasible allocation g′ such that U g
′
1 (x) > U
g
1 (x) for
any x) and weakly dominates RSW allocations. The latter fact with Theorem 1
implies that any core mechanism is an equilibrium allocation.
The next proposition proves the existence of an undominated core mechanism.
We can apply Theorem 4 of Myerson (1983), although some care should be exer-
cised because his environment has a finite set of basic outcomes whereas the set
is infinite here (i.e., the set of payments is unbounded).
Proposition 4. An undominated core mechanism exists.
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Remark 3. Neutral optimum defined by Myerson (1983) is stronger than core
mechanism and weaker than strong solution. He lists four axioms that the sets
of “blocked” interim payoff vectors for the principal should satisfy, and defines a
neutral optimum as a feasible allocation that cannot be blocked by any theory
of “blocking” that satisfies the four axioms. By applying Theorem 6 of Myerson
(1983), we can prove the existence of an undominated neutral optimum in our
environment in the same way as Proposition 4.17
As shown by the following proposition, if the seller’s type is binary, then any
core mechanism yields the high-type seller the highest equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 5. Let g be a core mechanism. Assume X = {1, 2}. Then U g1 (2) is
the highest interim payoff among all equilibria of the mechanism-selection game.
In the example of Section 2, any core mechanism selects the highest vertex
of the red triangle in Figure 3 as a unique prediction about the seller’s payoff
vector. Thus, in the example, the core mechanism makes a different prediction
from the intuitive criterion and D1. The characterization of core mechanisms in
more general cases is a challenging task but beyond the scope of this paper.
The second concept is defined by Maskin and Tirole (1992). An allocation
g passes the Farrell–Grossman–Perry (FGP) criterion if (i) g is feasible and (ii)
there is no allocation g′ such that U g
′
1 (x
′) > U g1 (x
′) for some x′ ∈ X and g′ ∈
∪pi1∈Π1BR(pi1, G) for some G ∈ G, where
Π1 := {pi1 ∈ ∆(Z ∪ Z0) | pi1(x)/p1(x) ≤ pi1(x′)/p1(x′) for all x, x′ if x′ ∈ Z} (19)
for Z := {x ∈ X | U g′1 (x) > U g1 (x)} and Z0 := {x ∈ X | U g
′
1 (x) = U
g
1 (x)}.
We observe that if g passes the FGP criterion, then g is an undominated core
mechanism and passes the intuitive criterion.
The following proposition shows that an allocation that passes the FGP crite-
rion exists if and only if a strong solution exists.
Proposition 6. If there is an allocation that passes the FGP criterion, then any
RSW allocation is undominated. If an RSW allocation g∗ is undominated, then g∗
passes the FGP criterion.
The third concept is introduced by Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2014). An alloca-
tion g is strongly neologism-proof if (i) g is feasible and (ii) for any belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X),
17Section B.2 of the Supplementary Material provides an example where neutral optima (and
thus core mechanisms) are dominated by another feasible allocation.
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there is no allocation g′ such that g′ is pi1-feasible and
U g
′
1 (x) ≥ U g1 (x) for any x with pi1(x) > 0, (20)
U g
′
1 (x) > U
g
1 (x) for some x with pi1(x) > 0. (21)
An immediate implication is that every strongly neologism-proof allocation passes
the FGP criterion.18
As shown by Mylovanov and Tro¨ger (2012, 2014), a strongly neologism-proof
allocation exists in environments with independent private values. The following
proposition shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the
allocation is U g
∗
1 = U
g¯
1 (i.e., the irrelevance of the seller’s privacy to her interim
payoffs), which is stringent to hold in our environment with interdependent values.
Proposition 7. Let g∗ and g¯ be RSW and full-information allocations respectively.
If a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists, then U g
∗
1 = U
g¯
1 . If U
g∗
1 = U
g¯
1 , then
g∗ is strongly neologism-proof.
7 Conclusion
We have studied informed principal problems in a context of bilateral trading. We
have shown that a D1 equilibrium exists and the D1 equilibrium payoff vectors
for both parties are characterized by some RSW allocation. The characterization
result holds even if the refinement concept is weakened to the intuitive criterion,
provided that the seller’s type is binary or her valuation is private. The RSW
allocation takes a simple format of (almost-)fixed prices under the monotonicity
assumption on the virtual surplus, and entails more severe undersupply than the
full-information allocation does. The privacy of the seller’s information reduces
both parties’ interim payoffs. These results may help us to better understand
the interaction between monopolistic screening and signaling in the mechanism-
selection game. The extension of our approach to more general environments is
left to future research.
18Section B.3 of the Supplementary Material shows that the converse is false in general.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Suppose that (q, t) is EPIC for the buyer. Take any x ∈ X
and y′, y ∈ Y with y′ > y. By the two IC conditions,
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y
′)
)
(q(x, y′)− q(x, y)) ≥ t(x, y′)− t(x, y)
≥ (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q(x, y′)− q(x, y)) .
Since v22 is strictly increasing in y, q(x, y
′) ≥ q(x, y).
(ii) Suppose that (q, t) is BIC for the buyer with pi1. Take any y
′, y ∈ Y with
y′ > y. By the two IC conditions,
Epi1x
[(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y
′)
)
(q(x, y′)− q(x, y))] ≥ Epi1x [t(x, y′)− t(x, y)]
≥ Epi1x
[(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
(q(x, y′)− q(x, y))] .
Since v22 is strictly increasing in y, Q
pi1
2 (y
′) = Epi1x [q(x, y
′)] ≥ Epi1x [q(x, y)] = Qpi12 (y).
(iii) We omit the proof because it is similar to part (ii).
The next lemma with the additive separability of the valuations in the types
materially helps our analysis. The result of Lemma 4 is due to Gershkov et al.
(2013). They consider a social choice environment with linear independent private
values in which a principal with no private information designs a mechanism.
Lemma 4. Let q˜ ∈ [0, 1]X×Y be an allocation rule and fix any belief pi1 ∈ ∆(X)
for the buyer. Suppose that Q˜1 ∈ [0, 1]X is decreasing in x and Q˜pi12 ∈ [0, 1]Y is
increasing in y. Given the interim allocation rules Q˜1 and Q˜
pi1
2 , let q ∈ [0, 1]X×Y
denote a solution to the following problem:
min
q∈[0,1]X×Y
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pi1(x)p2(y)(q(x, y))
2 (A.1)
s.t. Q1(x) := Ey [q(x, y)] = Q˜1(x) for all x ∈ X.
Qpi12 (y) := E
pi1
x [q(x, y)] = Q˜
pi1
2 (y) for all y ∈ Y.
Then q(·, y) is decreasing in x for all y and q(x, ·) is increasing in y for all x with
pi1(x) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. We only show that q(x, ·) is increasing in y for all x with
pi1(x) > 0; we can prove that q(·, y) is decreasing in x for all y by using a symmetric
argument. To derive a contradiction, suppose that q(x, y) > q(x, y′) for some
y < y′ and some x with pi1(x) > 0. Since Q
pi1
2 = Q˜
pi1
2 is increasing in y, there
25
is some type x′ 6= x such that q(x′, y) < q(x′, y′) with pi1(x′) > 0. Let α :=
ε/(pi1(x)(q(x, y)− q(x, y′))), α′ := ε/(pi1(x′)(q(x′, y′)− q(x′, y))), β := ε/p2(y) and
β′ := ε/p2(y′), where ε > 0 is sufficiently small that α, α′, β, β′ ∈ (0, 1). Define
q′(x, y) := (1− αβ)q(x, y) + αβq(x, y′)
q′(x′, y) := (1− α′β)q(x′, y) + α′βq(x′, y′)
q′(x, y′) := (1− αβ′)q(x, y′) + αβ′q(x, y)
q′(x′, y′) := (1− α′β′)q(x′, y′) + α′β′q(x′, y)
and q′(x′′, y′′) := q(x′′, y′′) for other (x′′, y′′). By construction, q′ ∈ [0, 1]X×Y . Now,∑
yˆ∈Y
p2(yˆ)q
′(x, yˆ) = Q1(x)− α (βp2(y)− β′p2(y′)) (q(x, y)− q(x, y′)) ,∑
yˆ∈Y
p2(yˆ)q
′(x′, yˆ) = Q1(x′) + α′ (βp2(y)− β′p2(y′)) (q(x′, y′)− q(x′, y)) ,∑
xˆ∈X
pi1(xˆ)q
′(xˆ, y) = Qpi12 (y)− β (αpi1(x) (q(x, y)− q(x, y′))− α′pi1(x′) (q(x′, y′)− q(x′, y))) ,∑
xˆ∈X
pi1(xˆ)q
′(xˆ, y′) = Qpi12 (y
′) + β′ (αpi1(x) (q(x, y)− q(x, y′))− α′pi1(x′) (q(x′, y′)− q(x′, y))) .
Since αpi1(x)(q(x, y)−q(x, y′)) = ε = α′pi1(x′)(q(x′, y′)−q(x′, y)) and βp2(y) = ε =
β′p2(y′), we obtain
∑
yˆ∈Y p2(yˆ)q
′(·, yˆ) ≡ Q1(·) ≡ Q˜1(·) and
∑
xˆ∈X pi1(xˆ)q
′(xˆ, ·) ≡
Qpi12 (·) ≡ Q˜pi12 (·), so that the perturbed rule q′ is feasible in problem (A.1). Finally,∑
xˆ∈X
∑
yˆ∈Y
pi1(xˆ)p2(yˆ)
[
(q′(xˆ, yˆ))2 − (q(xˆ, yˆ))2]
= −2ε2(q(x, y)− q(x, y′)) + ε4/pi1(x)p2(y) + ε4/pi1(x)p2(y′)
− 2ε2(q(x′, y′)− q(x′, y)) + ε4/pi1(x′)p2(y) + ε4/pi1(x′)p2(y′),
which can be negative because ε > 0 can be arbitrarily small. This contradicts
the hypothesis that q is a solution to (A.1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let L be the Lagrangian defined by (14).
(i) The terms in L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) multiplied by the payments are given by∑
x∈X
[(p1(x) + κ
∗(x)− κ∗(x− 1))p2(y¯)− λ∗(x, y¯)] t∗(x, y¯)
+
∑
x∈X
y¯−1∑
y=1
[(p1(x) + κ
∗(x)− κ∗(x− 1))p2(y)− λ∗(x, y) + λ∗(x, y + 1)] t∗(x, y),
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where κ∗(0) := 0 and κ∗(x¯) := 0. Since L(q∗, t, κ∗, λ∗) ≤ L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) for any
payment rule t ∈ RX×Y by saddle-point condition (15), we obtain that
λ∗(x, y¯) = (p1(x) + κ∗(x)− κ∗(x− 1))p2(y¯)
λ∗(x, y) = (p1(x) + κ∗(x)− κ∗(x− 1))p2(y) + λ∗(x, y + 1)
for each x ∈ X, y < y¯. Define pi1(x) := p1(x) + κ∗(x) − κ∗(x − 1) for each x.
Then the multipliers λ∗(x, y) are inductively given as in the statement. Now,∑
x∈X pi1(x) =
∑
x∈X p1(x) = 1. Since λ
∗(x, y) ≥ 0 and P2(y − 1) < 1 for each
x, y, pi1(x) ≥ 0 for each x. Hence, pi1 ∈ ∆(X).
(ii) Part (i) implies that the terms in L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) multiplied by the pay-
ments are equal to zero. Substituting the multipliers λ∗(x, y) given by part (i)
into the Lagrangian, we obtain by a simple computation that
L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗)− Ex[v11(x)]− Ey[v21(y)] (A.2)
=
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p2(y)
[
pi1(x)
(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
− κ∗(x− 1)dv1(x)
]
q∗(x, y),
where pi1 ∈ ∆(X) is defined in part (i). Since L(q, t∗, κ∗, λ∗) ≤ L(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ∗)
for any allocation rule q ∈ QX by saddle-point condition (15), each function
q∗(x, ·) ∈ Q is a solution to the maximization problem in the statement.
(iii) Fix any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y . Suppose first λ∗(x, y) > 0. Then the right
inequality of saddle-point condition (15) implies that ug
∗
2 (x, y) = u
g∗
2 (y − 1 | x, y)
if y > 1 and ug
∗
2 (x, y) = 0 if y = 1. Suppose next λ
∗(x, y) = 0. Then pi1(x) = 0
and thus κ∗(x − 1) > 0 by part (i). This fact together with part (ii) implies
q∗(x, ·) ≡ 0. Then t∗(x, ·) ≤ 0 because (q∗, t∗) satisfies the buyer’s local downward
EPICs and EPIR at the bottom. On the other hand, since (q∗, t∗) is a solution to
(13), t∗(x, ·) ≡ 0. We thus obtain the equations in the statement.
(iv) It is easy to prove by mathematical induction that an allocation g is
EPIC for the buyer if and only if it satisfies the local EPICs for the buyer (i.e.,
ug2(x, y) ≥ ug2(yˆ | x, y) for any x ∈ X, y, yˆ ∈ Y such that yˆ = 2 if y = 1, yˆ = y¯ − 1
if y = y¯, and yˆ = y ± 1 otherwise). Now, fix any x ∈ X, y ≥ 2. By part (iii),
t∗(x, y)− t∗(x, y − 1) = (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q∗(x, y)− q∗(x, y − 1))
≥ (v12(x) + v22(y − 1)) (q∗(x, y)− q∗(x, y − 1)) ,
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of q∗(x, ·) ∈ Q and v22. Hence,
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g∗ is EPIC for the buyer. This in turn implies that g∗ is EPIR for the buyer
because ug
∗
2 (x, y) ≥ ug
∗
2 (1 | x, y) ≥ ug
∗
2 (x, 1) ≥ 0, where the second inequality
follows from the monotonicity of v22.
(v) Clearly, g∗ is IIR for the seller. It is easy to prove by mathematical in-
duction that an allocation g is BIC for the seller if and only if it satisfies the
local BICs for the seller (i.e., U g1 (x) ≥ U g1 (xˆ | x) for any x, xˆ ∈ X such that
xˆ = 2 if x = 1, xˆ = x¯ − 1 if x = x¯, and xˆ = x ± 1 otherwise). Thus, it is
enough to show that g∗ satisfies the local downward BICs for the seller. Fix any
x ≥ 2. To derive a contradiction, suppose U g∗1 (x) < U g
∗
1 (x − 1 | x). We then
construct a new allocation (q, t) so that (q(x, ·), t(x, ·)) ≡ (q∗(x− 1, ·), t∗(x− 1, ·))
and (q(x′, ·), t(x′, ·)) ≡ (q∗(x′, ·), t∗(x′, ·)) for any x′ 6= x. Trivially, (q, t) satisfies
the local upward BICs for the seller. The allocation (q, t) also satisfies the local
downward EPICs for the buyer because, for each y ≥ 2,
t∗(x− 1, y)− t∗(x− 1, y − 1) = (v12(x− 1) + v22(y)) (q∗(x− 1, y)− q∗(x− 1, y − 1))
≤ (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q∗(x− 1, y)− q∗(x− 1, y − 1)) ,
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of q∗(x − 1, ·) ∈ Q and v12.
Similarly, (q, t) satisfies the buyer’s EPIR at the bottom. Hence, (q, t) is feasible
in (13), which contradicts the hypothesis that (q∗, t∗) solves (13).
(vi) Define the set Qpi1 of allocation rules as follows:
Qpi1 := {q ∈ [0, 1]X×Y | Ey[q(·, y)] is decreasing in x, Epi1x [q(x, ·)] is increasing in y}
Clearly, Qpi1 is convex. We claim that (q∗, t∗) is a solution to the following problem:
max
g=(q,t)∈Qpi1×RX×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (A.3)
s.t. U g1 (x) ≥ U g1 (x+ 1 | x) for any x < x¯.
U g2 (y, pi1) ≥ U g2 (y − 1 | y, pi1) for any y > 1.
U g2 (1, pi1) ≥ 0.
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We now define Lagrangian function L˜ for (A.3) as follows:
L˜(g, κ, λ˜) := Ex [U
g
1 (x)] +
x¯−1∑
x=1
κ(x) [U g1 (x)− U g1 (x+ 1 | x)] (A.4)
+
y¯∑
y=2
λ˜(y) [U g2 (y, pi1)− U g2 (y − 1 | y, pi1)] + λ˜(1)U g2 (1, pi1),
where (κ, λ˜) ∈ RX\{x¯}+ × RY+ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. Let λ˜∗(y) :=
1 − P2(y − 1) for each y. Part (i) then implies that pi1(x)λ˜∗(y) = λ∗(x, y) for
each x, y, so that L(q, t, κ∗, λ∗) = L˜(q, t, κ∗, λ˜∗) for any (q, t) ∈ QX ×RX×Y . Also,
L˜(q, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) = L˜(q, t, κ∗, λ˜∗) for any (q, t) ∈ Qpi1 × RX×Y . By interchanging
summations in equation (A.2), we obtain
L˜(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) =
∑
x∈X
(pi1(x)ψ(x)− κ∗(x− 1)dv1(x))Q∗1(x) + Ex[v11(x)] (A.5)
+
∑
y∈Y
(p2(y)φ(y)− (1− P2(y))dv2(y))Q∗pi12 (y) + Ey[v21(y)],
where Q∗1(·) := Ey[q∗(·, y)] and Q∗pi12 (·) := Epi1x [q∗(x, ·)]. Define Q := {q ∈
[0, 1]X×Y | Ey[q(·, y)] is decreasing in x, q is increasing in y} ⊂ QX ,Qpi1 . Then
L˜(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) = max
q∈QX
L˜(q, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) = max
q∈Q
L˜(q, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) = max
q∈Qpi1
L˜(q, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗),
where the first equality follows from saddle-point condition (15), the second from
part (v) with part (iii) of Lemma 1, and the last from Lemma 4 with equation
(A.5). We conclude that the Lagrangian L˜ has a saddle point at (q∗, t∗), (κ∗, λ˜∗):
L˜(q, t, κ∗, λ˜∗) ≤ L˜(q∗, t∗, κ∗, λ˜∗) ≤ L˜(q∗, t∗, κ, λ˜) (A.6)
for all (q, t) ∈ Qpi1 × RX×Y , (κ, λ˜) ∈ RX\{x¯}+ × RY+. Hence, our claim is true by
Theorem 2 in Section 8.4 of Luenberger (1969).
By parts (iv) and (v), the allocation (q∗, t∗) is also feasible in the following
problem and thus a solution to the problem by parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1:
max
g=(q,t)∈([0,1]×R)X×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (A.7)
s.t. g is both BIC and IIR for the seller.
g is both BIC and IIR for the buyer with pi1.
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Therefore, (q∗, t∗) is undominated given the buyer’s belief pi1.
The following lemma gives the “payoff and revenue equivalence” results.
Lemma 5. If an allocation g = (q, t) satisfies the buyer’s local downward EPICs
with equality for x (i.e., ug2(x, y) = u
g
2(y − 1 | x, y) for each y), then
ug2(x, y) = u
g
2(x, 1) +
y−1∑
yˆ=1
dv2(yˆ)q(x, yˆ) (A.8)
Ey [t(x, y)] = Ey
[(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)−
1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(x, y)
]
− ug2(x, 1) (A.9)
for each y ∈ Y , where ug2(x, y) = (v12(x) + v22(y)) q(x, y)− t(x, y).
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix any x ∈ X. By using the binding local downward EPICs
inductively, we can compute the buyer’s ex post payoff ug2(x, y) as in (A.8) for
each y ∈ Y . The expected payment Ey [t(x, y)] is computed as in (A.9) by an
interchange of summations.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let g∗ = (q∗, t∗) be an RSW allocation and suppose that
g∗ is undominated given pi1. The proof consists of steps (i)–(iii). In the steps, we
fix an arbitrary mechanism G = 〈S1, S2, q, t〉 6= g∗. Given G, let X be the set of
the seller’s types x ∈ X such that, for some x′ 6= x, condition (10) is satisfied,
where D(x,G) and D0(x,G) are defined by (7) and (8) given U g1 = U
g∗
1 . The set
X may be empty and X 6= X.
(i) We define an auxiliary game as follows. First, (x, y) is realized according
to (pi1, p2). Each player i ∈ {1, 2} is privately informed about her or his own type.
Second, the seller selects either the offer of G or an outside option. If the seller
selects the outside option, the game ends with (q∗(x, y), t∗(x, y)). If the seller offers
G, the buyer either accepts or rejects it. If the buyer rejects G, the game ends with
the no-trade outcome. If the buyer accepts G, then both players simultaneously
choose (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 and the game ends with (q(s1, s2), t(s1, s2)). Note that
the seller’s type is realized according to not p1 but pi1.
For each natural number k ∈ N, we define perturbed game k of an “agent
strategic form” of the auxiliary game as follows. There are 2(|X| + |Y |) agents
(players) in the perturbed game. Each type of seller or buyer has two agents. An
agent of the seller with type x chooses a probability γk1 (x) ∈ [δk(x), 1−δk(x)] with
which she offers G to the buyer, where δk(x) := 1/2k3 if x ∈ X and δk(x) := 1/2k if
x 6∈ X. The other agent of the seller chooses a probability distribution σk1(· | x) ∈
∆k(S1), where ∆
k(S1) := {σˆ1 ∈ ∆(S1) | σˆ1(s1) ≥ 1/|S1|k for any s1}. An agent of
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the buyer with type y chooses a probability γk2 (y) ∈ [1/2k, 1−1/2k] with which he
accepts G offered by the seller. The other agent of the buyer chooses a probability
distribution σk2(· | y) ∈ ∆k(S2), where ∆k(S2) := {σˆ2 ∈ ∆(S2) | σˆ2(s2) ≥ 1/|S2|k
for any s2}. Given an action profile (γk, σk) := (γk1 , γk2 , σk1 , σk2), both agents of the
seller with type x obtain the same payoff
γk1 (x)Ey
[
γk2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σk1(s1 | x)σk2(s2 | y)
(
t(s1, s2)−
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
q(s1, s2)
)]
+ γk1 (x)
(
v11(x) + Ey[v
2
1(y)]
)
+ (1− γk1 (x))U g
∗
1 (x),
and both agents of the buyer with type y obtain the same payoff
Eρ
k
1
x
[
γk1 (x)γ
k
2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σk1(s1 | x)σk2(s2 | y)
((
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
q(s1, s2)− t(s1, s2)
)]
+ Eρ
k
1
x
[
(1− γk1 (x))ug
∗
2 (x, y)
]
,
where (ρk1)
∞
k=1 is an arbitrary sequence of beliefs ρ
k
1 ∈ ∆(X) that converges to pi1
(in the Euclidean space RX) as k →∞ and satisfies ρk1(x) ≥ 1/|X|k for each k, x.
By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, each perturbed game k has at least one
Nash equilibrium. Fix any Nash equilibrium (γk, σk) for each k ∈ N. Define
full-support beliefs pik1 ∈ ∆(X) and pik2 ∈ ∆(Y ) for the buyer and seller as follows:
pik1(x) :=
ρk1(x)γ
k
1 (x)∑
x′∈X ρ
k
1(x
′)γk1 (x′)
(A.10)
pik2(y) :=
p2(y)γ
k
2 (y)∑
y′∈Y p2(y
′)γk2 (y′)
(A.11)
With some abuse of notation, we denote by (γk, σk, pik)∞k=1 a subsequence of the
mother sequence that converges in the Euclidean space, the existence of which is
guaranteed by the compactness of [0, 1]X×[0, 1]Y ×(∆(S1))X×(∆(S2))Y ×∆(X)×
∆(Y ). For each i = 1, 2, let γGi , σ
G
i and pi
G
i be the limits of the sequences (γ
k
i )
∞
k=1,
(σki )
∞
k=1 and (pi
k
i )
∞
k=1 respectively. Clearly, the limit (γ
G, σG) = (γG1 , γ
G
2 , σ
G
1 , σ
G
2 ) is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game. Define an allocation g = (q, t)
by
(q(x, y), t(x, y)) := γG2 (y)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σG1 (s1 | x)σG2 (s2 | y)(q(s1, s2), t(s1, s2)). (A.12)
(ii) We now show that U g1 (x) ≤ U g
∗
1 (x) for each x ∈ X. To derive a contra-
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diction, suppose that U g1 (x) > U
g∗
1 (x) for some x ∈ X. We then construct a new
allocation (q′, t′) as follows:
(q′(x, y), t′(x, y)) := γG1 (x) (q(x, y), t(x, y)) + (1− γG1 (x)) (q∗(x, y), t∗(x, y))
Since the strategy profile (γG, σG) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary
game by step (i), we obtain that γG1 (x) = 0 if U
g
1 (x) < U
g∗
1 (x), and γ
G
1 (x) = 1 if
U g1 (x) > U
g∗
1 (x). This fact together with the hypothesis that U
g
1 (x) > U
g∗
1 (x) for
some x ∈ X implies that the constructed allocation (q′, t′) dominates the RSW
allocation (q∗, t∗). Since (γG, σG) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary
game, the optimality for the buyer implies that
Epi1x
[
γG1 (x)u
g
2(x, y)
] ≥ Epi1x [γG1 (x)ug2(yˆ | x, y)] (A.13)
for any y, yˆ ∈ Y , and the left side of (A.13) is nonnegative. Since the RSW
allocation (q∗, t∗) is EPIC and EPIR for the buyer,
Epi1x
[
(1− γG1 (x))ug
∗
2 (x, y)
]
≥ Epi1x
[
(1− γG1 (x))ug
∗
2 (yˆ | x, y)
]
(A.14)
for any y, yˆ ∈ Y , and the left side of (A.14) is nonnegative. Summing inequalities
(A.13) and (A.14), we observe that the allocation (q′, t′) is both BIC and IIR for
the buyer with pi1. Since (γ
G, σG) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary
game, the optimality for the seller implies that
γG1 (x)U
g
1 (x) + (1− γG1 (x))U g
∗
1 (x) ≥ γG1 (xˆ)U g1 (xˆ | x) + (1− γG1 (xˆ))U g
∗
1 (x)
for any x, xˆ ∈ X. Since the RSW allocation (q∗, t∗) is BIC for the seller, U g∗1 (x) ≥
U g
∗
1 (xˆ | x) for any x, xˆ ∈ X. Thus, the allocation (q′, t′) is BIC for the seller.
Clearly, (q′, t′) is IIR for the seller. These facts contradict the hypothesis in the
proposition that the RSW allocation g∗ is undominated given pi1. We thus conclude
that U g1 (x) ≤ U g
∗
1 (x) for each x ∈ X.
(iii) We construct a D1 equilibrium in which every type of seller offers g∗
and every type of buyer accepts g∗. We now define an assessment (γ, σ, pi) :=
(γ1, (γ
G′
2 , σ
G′ , piG
′
)G′∈G) as follows. Let γ1(x) be the Dirac measure at g∗ for any
x. Define (γg
∗
2 , σ
g∗ , pig
∗
) so that γg
∗
2 ≡ 1, σg
∗
1 (x | x) ≡ 1, σg
∗
2 (y | y) ≡ 1 (i.e.,
truth-telling strategy), pig
∗
1 ≡ p1 and pig
∗
2 ≡ p2. For any other mechanism G 6= g∗,
let (γG2 , σ
G, piG) be the profile given by step (i).
First, we prove that (γ, σ, pi) is sequentially rational. Each player’s optimality
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conditions after g∗ is offered are obviously satisfied because the RSW allocation
g∗ is feasible. Here, we only show that the mixed action σG2 (· | y) is sequentially
rational for each type y of buyer with the belief piG1 ; a similar argument works
for the other cases. Fix any s′2 ∈ S2. Since the action profile (γk, σk) is a Nash
equilibrium of each perturbed game k ∈ N, we obtain that, for each y ∈ Y ,
γk2 (y)
∑
x∈X
pik1(x)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σk1(s1 | x)σk2(s2 | y)
((
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
q(s1, s2)− t(s1, s2)
)
≥ γk2 (y)
∑
x∈X
pik1(x)
∑
s1∈S1
∑
s2∈S2
σk1(s1 | x)σˆk2(s2)
((
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
q(s1, s2)− t(s1, s2)
)
for σˆk2 ∈ ∆k(S2) such that σˆk2(s2) = 1/|S2|k if s2 6= s′2. Dividing both sides of
this inequality by γk2 (y) > 0 and taking the limit k → ∞ in both sides yield the
desired result.
Second, we prove that (γ, σ, pi) is consistent. It is enough to show that the
restricted assessment (γ1, (γ
G′
2 , σ
G′ , piG
′
)G′∈{g∗,G}) is consistent (in the sense of
Kreps and Wilson (1982)) in the mechanisms-selection game where the set of
mechanisms the seller can offer is {g∗, G}. Define m := maxx′∈X 1/p1(x′) and
γˆk1 (x) := pi
k
1(x)/(p1(x)mk) for each x ∈ X, k ∈ N. For each x, k, γˆk1 (x) ∈ (0, 1)
and limk→∞ γˆk1 (x) = 0. By Bayes’ rule, the buyer’s belief pi
G
1 is derived from the
prior p1 and the sequence (γˆ
k
1 )
∞
k=1 of completely mixed actions as follows:
lim
k→∞
p1(x)γˆ
k
1 (x)∑
x′∈X p1(x
′)γˆk1 (x′)
= lim
k→∞
pik1(x) = pi
G
1 (x)
Similarly, we obtain
lim
k→∞
p2(y)γ
k
2 (y)∑
y′∈Y p2(y
′)γk2 (y′)
= lim
k→∞
pik2(y) = pi
G
2 (y)
for each y, where (γk2 )
∞
k=1 is the sequence given by step (i) with limk→∞ γ
k
2 = γ
G
2 .
Finally, we show that piG1 (x) = 0 if x ∈ X. Fix any x ∈ X. Let g be
the allocation given by (A.12). Now, g 6∈ D(x,G) ∪ D0(x,G) because if not,
then U g1 (x
′) > U g
∗
1 (x
′) for some x′ 6= x, which would contradict step (ii). Thus,
U g1 (x) < U
g∗
1 (x). Therefore, for any sufficiently large k, γ
k
1 (x) = δ
k(x) = 1/2k3
and thus
pik1(x) =
ρk1(x)γ
k
1 (x)∑
x′∈X ρ
k
1(x
′)γk1 (x′)
≤ (1− (|X| − 1)/|X|k)/2k
3
(1− (|X| − 1)/|X|k)/2k3 + |X \X|/2|X|k2 ,
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where the inequality follows from the facts that γk1 (x
′) ≥ δk(x′) = 1/2k if x′ ∈
X \ X and that ρk1(x′) ≥ 1/|X|k for any x′. Note that |X \ X| > 0. Thus,
piG1 (x) = limk→∞ pi
k
1(x) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1
with part (vi) of Lemma 2.
The following lemma gives the interim payoff equivalence result. We will fre-
quently use the result in what follows.
Lemma 6. Suppose that g˜ = (q˜, t˜) is BIC for the seller and for the buyer with p1.
Let q be a solution to the minimization problem (A.1) given the interim allocation
rules Q˜1(·) = Ey[q˜(·, y)] and Q˜2(·) = Ex[q˜(x, ·)]. Then the following hold:
(i) There is a payment rule t such that g := (q, t) is BIC for the seller and EPIC
for the buyer, and U g1 = U
g˜
1 , U
g
2 = U
g˜
2 .
(ii) If g˜ is IIR for the buyer with p1, then there is a payment rule t
′ such that
g′ := (q, t′) is BIC for the seller and EPIC for the buyer, ug
′
2 (x, y) = u
g′
2 (y−1 | x, y)
for each x ∈ X, y ≥ 2, U g′2 (1) ≥ 0, and U g
′
1 = U
g˜
1 .
Proof of Lemma 6. (i) Lemmas 1 and 4 imply that the new allocation rule q sat-
isfies both Q1(·) := Ey[q(·, y)] ≡ Q˜1(·) and Q2(·) := Ex[q(x, ·)] ≡ Q˜2(·), and is
increasing in y. Let T˜2(·) := Ex[t˜(x, ·)]. Define a payment rule t inductively by
t(x, 1) :=
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)
)
q(x, 1) + U g˜1 (x) (A.15)
− Ey
[(
ψ(x) +
(
α(y)− v21(y)
)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dα(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
t(x, y) := t(x, y − 1) + (v12(x) + α(y)) (q(x, y)− q(x, y − 1)) (A.16)
for each x ∈ X and y ≥ 2, where dα(y) := α(y + 1)− α(y) for each y ∈ Y ,
α(y) :=

T˜2(y)− T˜2(y − 1)− Ex [v12(x) (q˜(x, y)− q˜(x, y − 1))]
Q˜2(y)− Q˜2(y − 1)
if Q˜2(y) > Q˜2(y − 1)
v22(y) if Q˜2(y) = Q˜2(y − 1)
for each y ≥ 2, α(1) := v22(1) and α(y¯+ 1) := 0. Since g˜ is BIC for the buyer with
p1, v
2
2(y − 1) ≤ α(y) ≤ v22(y) for any y > 1. This together with (A.16) and the
monotonicity of q in y implies that g is EPIC for the buyer.
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Each type x of seller obtains the following interim payoff from g:
U g1 (x) = Ey
[(
ψ(x) +
(
α(y)− v21(y)
)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dα(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
− ug2(x, 1)
= U g˜1 (x), (A.17)
where the second equality follows from the definition of t(x, 1). The seller’s interim
payoff equivalence implies that g is BIC for the seller because, for each x, xˆ ∈ X,
U g1 (x) = U
g˜
1 (x) ≥ U g˜1 (xˆ)−
(
v11(xˆ)− v11(x)
) (
1− Q˜1(xˆ)
)
= U g1 (xˆ)−
(
v11(xˆ)− v11(x)
)
(1−Q1(xˆ))
= U g1 (xˆ | x),
where the inequality follows from the hypothesis that g˜ is BIC for the seller.
We now obtain the equivalence of ex ante expected social surplus as follows:
Ex,y [(ψ(x) + φ(y)) q(x, y)] = Ex [ψ(x)Q1(x)] + Ey [φ(y)Q2(y)]
= Ex
[
ψ(x)Q˜1(x)
]
+ Ey
[
φ(y)Q˜2(y)
]
= Ex,y [(ψ(x) + φ(y)) q˜(x, y)]
The equivalence implies Ex[U
g
1 (x)] + Ey[U
g
2 (y)] = Ex[U
g˜
1 (x)] + Ey[U
g˜
2 (y)]. By the
seller’s interim payoff equivalence (A.17), Ey[U
g
2 (y)] = Ey[U
g˜
2 (y)]. Finally, we
prove the buyer’s interim payoff equivalence. By definition of t and α,
U g2 (y)− U g2 (y − 1) = v22(y)Q2(y)− v22(y − 1)Q2(y − 1)− α(y) (Qg2(y)−Qg2(y − 1))
= v22(y)Q˜2(y)− v22(y − 1)Q˜2(y − 1)− α(y)
(
Q˜g2(y)− Q˜g2(y − 1)
)
= U g˜2 (y)− U g˜2 (y − 1)
for any y ≥ 2. This fact together with Ey[U g2 (y)] = Ey[U g˜2 (y)] implies U g2 = U g˜2 .
(ii) Define a payment rule t′ inductively by
t′(x, 1) :=
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)
)
q(x, 1) + U g˜1 (x)
− Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
t′(x, y) := t′(x, y − 1) + (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q(x, y)− q(x, y − 1))
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for each x ∈ X and y ≥ 2. By construction, g′ := (q, t′) satisfies the local
downward EPICs for the buyer, so that g′ is EPIC for the buyer. The same
argument as part (i) shows that g′ is BIC for the seller and satisfies U g
′
1 = U
g˜
1 .
Finally, U g
′
2 (1) = Ex[u
g′
2 (x, 1)] ≥ 0 and thus g′ is IIR for the buyer with p1 because
Ex
[
U g˜1 (x)
]
≤ Ex,y
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q˜(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
= Ex,y
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
,
where the inequality follows from the hypothesis that g˜ is both BIC and IIR for
the buyer with p1, and the equation from Q˜1 ≡ Q1 and Q˜2 ≡ Q2.
We now show that if type x has the minimal effect on the buyer’s valuation,
then type x obtains at least the full-information payoff U g¯1 (x) in any equilibrium.
Lemma 7. Let g and g¯ be equilibrium and full-information allocations respectively.
Then U g1 (x) ≥ U g¯1 (x) for any x with v12(x) = v12(1).
Proof of Lemma 7. Let (γ, σ, pi) be an equilibrium with an equilibrium allocation
g and g¯ = (q¯, t¯) be the full-information allocation defined by Lemma 3. Fix any x
with v12(x) = v
1
2(1). To derive a contradiction, suppose U
g
1 (x) < U
g¯
1 (x). Then the
menu G := (q¯(x, ·), t¯(x, ·)) is a fixed price with a threshold yˆ ∈ Y and the price
τ := v12(x) + v
2
2(yˆ) > v
1
1(x) + v
2
1(yˆ). Fix any ε > 0 with U
g
1 (x) < U
g¯
1 (x) − ε and
τ − ε > v11(x) + v21(yˆ). If the seller of x deviated from the equilibrium strategy
γ1(x) to G, then each type y ≥ yˆ of buyer would accept G and choose the outcome
(1, τ − ε) because ∑x′∈X piG1 (x′)v12(x′) + v22(y) ≥ v12(x) + v22(y) > τ − ε, so that
the seller could obtain a weakly higher interim payoff than U g¯1 (x)− ε; some type
y < yˆ of buyer might also accept G and choose (1, τ − ε), but the choice would
be beneficial for the seller because τ − ε > v11(x) + v21(y) for any y < yˆ. This
contradicts the assumption that (γ, σ) is sequentially rational.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let g∗ be an RSW allocation and (γ˜, σ˜, p˜i) be a D1 equi-
librium with an equilibrium allocation g˜. To derive a contradiction, suppose
U g˜1 6= U g
∗
1 . By using Lemma 6, we take a feasible allocation g = (q, t) that is
EPIC for the buyer and satisfies U
g
1 = U
g˜
1 . Let x
′ := min{x ∈ X | U g1 (x) < U g
∗
1 (x)
or u
g
2(x, 1) > 0}, which is well-defined because if U
g
1 ≥ U g
∗
1 , then g dominates the
RSW allocation g∗, so that u
g
2(x, 1) < 0 for some x and thus u
g
2(x, 1) > 0 for some
x. Define g∗ = (q∗, t∗) so that g∗ := g∗ if U
g
1 (x
′) < U g
∗
1 (x
′), and g∗ := g otherwise.
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We now define a menu G = 〈∅, Y, q, t〉 as follows. The allocation rule q ∈ [0, 1]Y
is inductively defined by
q(1) :=
q∗(x′, 1) if ψ(x′) + φ(1) >
1−P2(1)
p2(1)
dv2(1)
0 otherwise
(A.18)
q(y) :=
q∗(x′, y) if ψ(x′) + φ(y) >
1−P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
q(y − 1) otherwise
(A.19)
for each y ≥ 2. The monotonicity of q∗(x′, ·) in y implies that q is increasing in y
and q(·) ≤ q∗(x′, ·). The payment rule t ∈ RY is inductively defined by
t(1) :=
(
v12(x
′) + v22(1)− ε
)
q(1) (A.20)
t(y) := t(y − 1) + (v12(x′) + v22(y)− ε) (q(y)− q(y − 1)) (A.21)
for each y ≥ 2, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small that
ε < v22(y)− v22(y − 1) if y ≥ 2, (A.22)
ε < ψ(x) + φ(y) if ψ(x) + φ(y) > 0, (A.23)
and
U
g
1 (x
′) < Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x
′) + v21(y)
)
(1− q(y))] (A.24)
= Ey
[(
ψ(x′) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)− ε
)
q(y)
]
+ v11(x
′) + Ey[v21(y)];
we can obtain the positive number ε because g is EPIC for the buyer, so that
Ey[t(x
′, y)] is not higher than the expected virtual valuation by Lemma 5, and
either U
g
1 (x
′) < U g
∗
1 (x
′) or u
g
2(x
′, 1) > 0 holds.
We prove that p˜iG1 (x) = 0 if x < x
′. Fix any pi1 ∈ ∆(X) and any g′ =
(q′, t′) ∈ BR(pi1, G). By definition of BR, the buyer has responses (γ2, σ2) to
G such that γ2(y) > 0 only if maxyˆ∈Y ((Epi1x [v
1
2(x)] + v
2
2(y))q(yˆ) − t(yˆ)) ≥ 0,
σ2(y
′ | y) > 0 only if y′ ∈ arg maxyˆ∈Y ((Epi1x [v12(x)] + v22(y))q(yˆ) − t(yˆ)), and
(q′(y), t′(y)) = γ2(y)
∑
yˆ∈Y σ2(yˆ | y)(q(y), t(y)) for each y. Suppose U g
′
1 (x
′) ≤
U g˜1 (x
′). Then U g
′
1 (x
′) ≤ U g1 (x′) ≤ U
g∗
1 (x
′). By (A.21),(A.23),(A.24), this occurs
only if Epi1x [v
1
2(x)] ≤ v12(x′). The inequality with (A.22) implies that σ2(yˆ | y) = 0
if q(yˆ) > q(y), so that q′(·) ≤ q(·) ≤ q∗(x′, ·). Also, there exists some y with
q′(y) < q∗(x′, y) because if not, then q′ = q, t′ = t and thus U
g
1 (x
′) < U g
′
1 (x
′) by
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(A.24). Hence, if x < x′, then
0 ≤ U g∗1 (x′)− U g
′
1 (x
′) = Ey
[
t∗(x′, y)− t′(y)− (v11(x′) + v21(y)) (q∗(x′, y)− q′(y))]
< Ey
[
t∗(x′, y)− t′(y)− (v11(x) + v21(y)) (q∗(x′, y)− q′(y))]
= U
g∗
1 (x
′ | x)− U g′1 (x)
≤ U g∗1 (x)− U g
′
1 (x)
≤ U g1 (x)− U g
′
1 (x),
so that U g
′
1 (x) < U
g˜
1 (x) and thus p˜i
G
1 (x) = 0 because (γ˜, σ˜, p˜i) is a D1 equilibrium.
We now obtain
∑
x∈X p˜i
G
1 (x)v
1
2(x) ≥ v12(x′). This fact with (A.20) and (A.21)
implies that γ˜G2 (y) = 1 if q(y) > 0 and that σ˜
G
2 (yˆ | y) = 0 if q(yˆ) < q(y) (or
equivalently if t(yˆ) < t(y)). Then the seller of x′ benefits from offering the menu
G because
U g˜1 (x
′) < Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x
′) + v21(y)
)
(1− q(y))]
≤ Ey
[∑
yˆ∈Y
σ˜G2 (yˆ | y)
(
t(yˆ) +
(
v11(x
′) + v21(y)
)
(1− q(yˆ)))] ,
where the first inequality follows from (A.24) with U
g
1 (x
′) = U g˜1 (x
′) and the second
from (A.23). This contradicts the hypothesis that (γ˜, σ˜) is sequentially rational.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof consists of steps (i)–(iii). In part (i), we define
basic notations by applying those in the proof of Theorem 2. In parts (ii) and
(iii), we prove the statement by assuming X = {1, 2} and v21 ≡ 0 respectively.
(i) Let g∗ be an RSW allocation and g˜ be an equilibrium allocation that passes
the intuitive criterion. To derive a contradiction, suppose U g˜1 6= U g
∗
1 . By using
Lemma 6, we take a feasible allocation g = (q, t) that is EPIC for the buyer and
satisfies U
g
1 = U
g˜
1 . Let x
′ := min{x ∈ X | U g1 (x) < U g
∗
1 (x) or u
g
2(x, 1) > 0}.
Lemma 7 implies v12(x
′) > v12(1). Define g
∗ = (q∗, t∗) so that g∗ := g∗ if U
g
1 (x
′) <
U g
∗
1 (x
′), and g∗ := g otherwise. Let q ∈ [0, 1]Y be an allocation rule defined as
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follows, where a(x′) ∈ (0, 1) will be defined shortly:
q(1) :=
a(x′)q∗(x′, 1) if ψ(x′) + φ(1) >
1−P2(1)
p2(1)
dv2(1)
0 otherwise
(A.25)
q(y) :=
a(x′)q∗(x′, y) if ψ(x′) + φ(y) >
1−P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
a(x′)q(y − 1) otherwise
(A.26)
for any y ≥ 2. Since g is IIR for the seller and either U g1 (x′) < U g
∗
1 (x
′) or u
g
2(x
′, 1) >
0 holds, q∗(y¯) > 0 and thus q(y¯) > 0. Let y′(x′) := min{y ∈ Y | q(y) > 0}. By
using the allocation rule q, we define t ∈ RY in the same way as (A.20) and
(A.21). In addition to the assumptions (A.22) and (A.23) in Theorem 2, we make
ε sufficiently small that ε < v12(x
′)+v22(1). We also set ε > 0, a(x
′) ∈ (0, 1) so that
U
g∗
1 (x
′) < Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x
′) + v21(y)
)
(1− q(y))] , (A.27)
U
g∗
1 (x
′ | x) > Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
(1− q(y))] (A.28)
for each x < x′. This is possible because q∗(x′, ·) ≥ q(·), and q(·) is defined by
(A.18) and (A.19), so that U
g∗
1 (x
′) < Ey [t(y) + (v11(x
′) + v21(y)) (1− q(y))] if both
ε = 0 and a(x′) = 1 held, and U
g∗
1 (x
′) ≥ Ey [t(y) + (v11(x′) + v21(y)) (1− q(y))] if
both ε = 0 and a(x′) = 0 held.
(ii) Assume X = {1, 2}. Then, x′ = 2. Let G = 〈∅, Y, q, t〉 be the menu defined
in part (i). Fix any pi1 ∈ ∆(X) and let (γ2, σ2) be mixed best responses to G for
the buyer with pi1. Since E
pi1
x [v
1
2(x)] ≤ v12(2), inequality (A.22) implies that σ2(yˆ |
y) = 0 if q(yˆ) > q(y). Thus, D(1, G)∪D0(1, G) = ∅ by (A.23) and (A.28), where
D(1, G) and D0(1, G) are defined by (7) and (8) given the equilibrium allocation
g˜. Now, if pi1(2) = 1 and g
′ ∈ BR(pi1, G), then U g′1 (2) > U
g∗
1 (2) ≥ U
g
1 (2) = U
g˜
1 (2)
by (A.27). This contradicts the hypothesis that g˜ passes the intuitive criterion.
(iii) Assume v21 ≡ 0. We inductively define y′(x) := min{y ∈ Y | y ≥ y′(x −
1), v12(x)+v
2
2(y) > v
1
1(x)} for x > x′; if v12(x)+v22(y¯) ≤ v11(x), then let y′(xˆ) := y¯+1
for each xˆ ≥ x. Assume without loss of generality that v12 is strictly increasing in
x; we can easily relax the assumption, at the cost of some notational complexity,
by partitioning X into some disjoint subsets X1, ..., Xn such that v
1
2(xk) = v
1
2(xl)
if and only if xk, xl ∈ Xm for some m, and by assuming that if xk, xl ∈ Xm
for some m, then (q(xk, ·), t(xk, ·)) ≡ (q(xl, ·), t(xl, ·)) and (q′(xk, ·), t′(xk, ·)) ≡
(q′(xl, ·), t′(xl, ·)), where (q, t) and (q′, t′) are constructed as follows.
With some abuse of notation, we construct an allocation g = (q, t) as follows.
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Let (q(x, ·), t(x, ·)) ≡ (q(·), t(·)) if x ≤ x′, where (q(·), t(·)) ∈ [0, 1]Y × RY is
the menu defined in part (i). The allocation rule q ∈ [0, 1]X×Y is inductively
defined by q(x, 1) := a(x, 1)q(x − 1, 1) and q(x, y) := a(x, y)q(x − 1, y) + (1 −
a(x, y))q(x, y − 1) for each x > x′, y ≥ 2, where a(x, y) := 0 if y < y′(x),
and a(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) if y ≥ y′(x). By construction, q is decreasing in x and
increasing in y, and q(x, y) > 0 if y ≥ y′(x). The payment rule t ∈ RX×Y is
inductively defined by t(x, 1) := (v12(x) + v
2
2(1)− ε) q(x, 1) and t(x, y) := t(x, y −
1) + (v12(x) + v
2
2(y)− ε) (q(x, y)− q(x, y − 1)) for each x > x′, y ≥ 2. For each
x > x′, the following two inequalities hold by the definitions of y′, t with (A.23):
t(x− 1, y) > v11(x− 1)q(x− 1, y) if y ≥ y′(x− 1), (A.29)
t(x− 1, y) < v11(x)q(x− 1, y) if y′(x− 1) ≤ y < y′(x). (A.30)
We claim that, for each x > x′ and each y ≥ y′(x), a(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) can be set
so that q(x, y) = a(x, y)q(x− 1, y) + (1− a(x, y))q(x, y − 1) < q(x− 1, y),
t(x− 1, y)− t(x, y) > v11(x− 1) (q(x− 1, y)− q(x, y)) , (A.31)
t(x− 1, y)− t(x, y) < v11(x) (q(x− 1, y)− q(x, y)) . (A.32)
The proof proceeds by induction on x and y. Let x = x′ + 1. For y = y′(x), we
can find a(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) such that both (A.31) and (A.32) are satisfied because
q(x, y) = t(x, y) = 0 would hold if a(x, y) were zero, and both q(x, y) = q(x− 1, y)
and t(x, y)− t(x− 1, y) = (v12(x)− v12(x− 1))q(x, y) +
∑
yˆ<y dv2(yˆ)q(x− 1, yˆ) > 0
would hold if a(x, y) were one. For y = y′(x) + 1, ..., y¯, we can find a(x, y) ∈ (0, 1)
such that both (A.31) and (A.32) are satisfied because both q(x, y) = q(x, y − 1)
and t(x, y) = t(x, y−1) would hold (so (A.31) would hold by inductive hypothesis)
if a(x, y) were zero, and both q(x, y) = q(x− 1, y) and t(x, y) > t(x− 1, y) would
hold if a(x, y) were one. Continuing this way inductively, we can prove the claim.
Together with the fact that q(x, y) = t(x, y) = 0 if y < y′(x), inequalities (A.29)–
(A.32) imply that truth-telling is a weakly dominant action in g for each type x
of seller.
Furthermore, we construct a perturbed allocation g′ = (q′, t′) from g such
that (q′(x, ·), t′(x, ·)) ≡ (q′(x′, ·), t′(x′, ·)) if x < x′, as follows. If y′(x¯) = 1,
then we let g′ := g and complete the construction of g′. We now assume that
y′(x) ≥ 2 for some x, and denote x′′ := min{x ∈ {x′, ..., x¯} | y′(x) ≥ 2}. Define
b(x) := (v12(x− 1) + v22(1)− ε) / (v12(x) + v22(1)− ε) ∈ (0, 1) for each x > x′′. Let
q′(x, y) := q(x, y) if y ≥ y′(x). Let q′(x′′, 1) ∈ (0, 1) be an arbitrarily small num-
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ber. We inductively define q′(x, 1) := b(x)q′(x − 1, 1) > 0 for x > x′′. For each
x, y with 1 < y < y′(x), let q′(x, y) := q′(x, y − 1) if q′(x′, y) = q′(x′, y − 1), and
q′(x, y) := q′(x, y− 1) + c otherwise, where c ∈ (0, 1) is sufficiently small that q′ is
decreasing in x and increasing in y. Finally, we define t′ so that, for each x ≥ x′,
t′(x, y) := t(x, y) if y ≥ y′(x), and
t′(x, 1) :=
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)− ε
)
q′(x, 1)− δ(x) (A.33)
t′(x, y) := t′(x, y − 1) + (v12(x) + v22(y)− ε) (q′(x, y)− q′(x, y − 1)) (A.34)
if 1 < y < y′(x), where δ(x′′) := 0, and δ(x) := δ(x − 1) + (1− b(x)) q′(x −
1, 1) (v11(x) + v
1
1(x− 1)) /2 for each x > x′′.
We make q′(x′′, 1) (and thus δ(·)) and c sufficiently small that U g′1 (x′) > U
g∗
1 (x
′),
U
g∗
1 (x
′ | x) > Ey
[
γ2(y)t
′(x′, y) +
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
(1− γ2(y)q′(x′, y))
]
(A.35)
for any x < x′, γ2 ∈ [0, 1]Y such that γ2(y) = 1 if y ≥ y′(x′), and, for any x ≥ x′′,
(v12(x) + v
2
2(y))q
′(x, y − 1)− t′(x, y − 1) < εq′(x, y) if y = y′(x), (A.36)
t′(x− 1, y)− t′(x, y) > v11(x− 1)(q′(x− 1, y)− q′(x, y)) and (A.37)
t′(x− 1, y)− t′(x, y) < v11(x)(q′(x− 1, y)− q′(x, y)) (A.38)
if y′(x − 1) ≤ y < y′(x); note that (A.37) and (A.38) are guaranteed by (A.29)
and (A.30). We also make c sufficiently small that, for any x ≥ x′′,
t′(x− 1, y)− t′(x, y) = δ(x)− δ(x− 1)− (v12(x)− v12(x− 1)) kc
> v11(x− 1) (q′(x− 1, y)− q′(x, y)) (A.39)
if 1 ≤ y < y′(x − 1), where k := 0 if y = 1, and k := |{yˆ ∈ {2, ..., y} | q′(x′, yˆ) >
q′(x′, yˆ − 1)}| otherwise. The equation in (A.39) also implies (A.38) for y <
y′(x − 1). These facts, together with (A.31) and (A.32), imply that truth-telling
is a strictly dominant action in g′ for each type x > x′ of seller. Similarly, truth-
telling strictly dominates reporting xˆ > x′ for each type x ≤ x′ of seller.
Fix any pi1 ∈ ∆(X) and any allocation g′′ = (q′′, t′′) ∈ BR(pi1, g′). By defini-
tion of BR, we obtain a sequential equilibrium strategy profile (γ2, σ1, σ2) in the
continuation game given (pi1, g
′) such that, for each x ∈ X, y ∈ Y ,
(q′′(x, y), t′′(x, y)) = γ2(y)
∑
xˆ∈X
∑
yˆ∈Y
σ1(xˆ | x)σ2(yˆ | y)(q′(xˆ, yˆ), t′(xˆ, yˆ)).
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The argument in the previous paragraph implies that σ1(x | x) = 1 if x > x′,
and σ1(xˆ | x) = 0 if x ≤ x′ < xˆ. Then, by (A.22), σ2(yˆ | y) = 0 if q′(x′, yˆ) >
q′(x′, y) (or equivalently q′(x, yˆ) > q′(x, y) for any x). Hence, by (A.23) and
(A.35), if x < x′, then U g
′′
1 (x) < U
g∗
1 (x
′ | x) ≤ U g∗1 (x) ≤ U
g
1 (x) = U
g˜
1 (x) and thus
D(x, g′) ∪D0(x, g′) = ∅, where D(x, g′) and D0(x, g′) are defined by (7) and (8)
given G = g′ and the equilibrium allocation g˜. Now, if pi1 ∈ ∆({x′, ..., x¯}), then
U g
′′
1 (x
′) = U g
′
1 (x
′) > U
g∗
1 (x
′) ≥ U g1 (x′) = U g˜1 (x′). This contradicts the hypothesis
that g˜ passes the intuitive criterion.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix any equilibrium allocation g˜ such that U g˜1 is the seller’s
RSW payoff vector. By Lemma 6, we obtain a feasible allocation g∗ that is EPIC
for the buyer and satisfies U g
∗
1 = U
g˜
1 , U
g∗
2 = U
g˜
2 . We complete the proof by
showing that ug
∗
2 (x, 1) = 0 for any x and thus g
∗ is an RSW allocation. To derive
a contradiction, suppose ug
∗
2 (x, 1) 6= 0 for some x. Since g∗ is IIR for the buyer
with p1, we obtain a type x
′ with ug
∗
2 (x
′, 1) > 0. Define an allocation g′ = (q′, t′)
as follows: (q′(x, ·), t′(x, ·)) := (q∗(x, ·), t∗(x, ·)) if x = x′, and (q′(x, ·), t′(x, ·)) :=
(q(x, ·), t(x, ·)) otherwise, where (q, t) is an RSW allocation. Since U g′1 is the RSW
payoff vector, g′ is an RSW allocation. This contradicts part (iii) of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix any x ∈ X. It is enough to show that there is a fixed
price that is a solution to (16) and satisfies (i)–(iii) in the statement. Consider the
following problem, where Q is the set of all increasing functions on Y into [0, 1]:
max
(q,t)∈Q×RY
Ey
[
t(y) +
(
v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
)
(1− q(y))] (A.40)
s.t.
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(y)
)
(q(y)− q(y − 1)) ≥ t(y)− t(y − 1) for each y ≥ 2.(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)
)
q(1)− t(1) ≥ 0.
Clearly, any solution to problem (A.40) must satisfy all the constraints with
equality. Then, by Lemma 5, a menu (q, t) with t(1) = (v12(x) + v
2
2(1)) q(1) and
t(y) = t(y − 1) + (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q(y)− q(y − 1)) for each y ≥ 2 is a solution to
(A.40) and (16) if and only if q is a solution to the following problem:
max
q∈Q
Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(y)
]
(A.41)
The nonempty set Q is a compact and convex subspace of the Euclidean space
RY . We say that a function q ∈ Q is an extreme point of Q if q 6= aq′ + (1− a)q′′
for any distinct functions q′, q′′ ∈ Q and a ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to verify that an
increasing function q ∈ Q is an extreme point of Q if and only if q(y) ∈ {0, 1}
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for each y. The objective function of q in problem (A.41) is a continuous linear
functional on RY . The extreme point theorem (see, e.g., Ok, 2007) then implies
that there is an extreme point of Q that is a solution to problem (A.41). Thus,
the set of extreme points of Q that solve (A.41) is nonempty and finite. Denote
the maximum element in the set by q¯. Define a number y¯(x) ∈ Y ∪ {y¯ + 1} so
that q¯(y) = 1 if y ≥ y¯(x) and q¯(y) = 0 if y < y¯(x). We now construct a function
t¯ ∈ RY so that t¯(y) := v12(x) + v22(y¯(x)) if y ≥ y¯(x) and t¯(y) := 0 if y < y¯(x). The
menu (q¯, t¯) is a fixed price. Finally, condition (iii) follows from the fact that q¯ is
the maximum element in the set of extreme points of Q that solve (A.41).
Proof of Theorem 5. Take any x ∈ X. The function q∗(x, ·) ∈ Q is a solution to
the maximization problem in part (ii) of Lemma 2. Let pi1 ∈ ∆(X) be the buyer’s
posterior defined by part (i) of Lemma 2. If pi1(x) = 0 (and thus κ
∗(x− 1) > 0),
then q∗(x, ·) = t∗(x, ·) ≡ 0, which is an almost-fixed price trivially. If pi1(x) > 0,
then the objective function is strictly increasing in y, so that there is a threshold
yˆ ∈ Y such that q∗(x, y) = 0 if y < yˆ and q∗(x, y) = 1 if y > yˆ. Then the menu
(q∗(x, ·), t∗(x, ·)) is an almost-fixed price by part (iii) of Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 6. Take any x ∈ X. Let y¯(x) be the threshold of the fixed price
(q¯(x, ·), t¯(x, ·)). Then q¯(x, y) = 0 if y < y¯(x), and q¯(x, y) = 1 if y ≥ y¯(x). The
increasing function q∗(x, ·) ∈ Q is a solution to the maximization problem in part
(ii) of Lemma 2. Let pi1 ∈ ∆(X) be the buyer’s posterior defined by part (i) of
Lemma 2. If pi1(x) = 0 (and thus κ
∗(x − 1) > 0), then q∗(x, ·) ≡ 0 ≤ q¯(x, ·). If
pi1(x) > 0, then q
∗(x, y) = 0 for each y < y¯(x) by part (iii) of Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix any x ∈ X. The function q¯(x, ·) ∈ Q on Y is a
solution to (A.41) in the proof of Lemma 3. Since the social surplus ψ(x) + φ(·)
is increasing in y, the function q(x, ·) is increasing in y. Then there is a threshold
yˆ ∈ Y ∪ {y¯ + 1} such that q(x, y) = 0 if y < yˆ and q(x, y) = 1 otherwise. Hence,
ψ(x) + φ(y) < 0 for any y < yˆ, so that q¯(x, y) = 0 if y < yˆ.
Proof of Theorem 7. Fix any x ∈ X. By part (iii) of Lemma 2 with Lemma 5,
U g
∗
1 (x) = Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q∗(x, y)
]
+ v11(x) + Ey[v
2
1(y)].
Then Theorem 6 implies that the function q∗(x, ·) ∈ Q is distorted downward from
q¯(x, ·) and thus U g∗1 (x) ≤ U g¯1 (x).
Proof of Theorem 8. The claim is a consequence of part (iii) of Lemma 2, equation
(A.8) in Lemma 5 and Theorem 6.
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Proof of Theorem 9. (i) Since problem (18) is less constrained than problem (11),
we obtain the left inequality Ex[U
g∗
1 (x)] ≤ Ex[U g
∗∗
1 (x)]. We now prove the right
inequality Ex[U
g∗∗
1 (x)] ≤ Ex[U g¯1 (x)]. By part (ii) of Lemma 6, the maximum ex
ante payoff of problem (18) is equal to that of the following problem:
max
g=(q,t)∈QX×RX×Y
Ex [U
g
1 (x)] (A.42)
s.t. U g1 (x) ≥ U g1 (xˆ | x) for each x, xˆ ∈ X.
ug2(x, y) = u
g
2(y − 1 | x, y) for each x ∈ X, y ≥ 2.
Ex [u
g
2(x, 1)] ≥ 0.
Since the buyer’s local downward EPICs are binding in (A.42), Lemma 5 implies
that the objective functional is given as follows:
Ex,y
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)− ug2(x, 1)
]
On the other hand, each function q¯(x, ·) ∈ Q in the full-information allocation
maximizes the expected virtual surplus. This completes the proof for (i).
(ii) We now construct an ex ante optimal allocation that yields the same ex ante
payoff to the seller as that in the full-information allocation g¯ = (q¯, t¯). Assume
that Q¯1 is decreasing in x. Given the allocation rule q¯, we inductively define a
payment rule t as follows:
m :=
x¯∑
x=2
p1(x)
x∑
x′=2
[
U g¯1 (x
′)− U g¯1 (x′ − 1)− dv1(x′)(1− Q¯1(x′))
]
t(1, 1) :=
(
v12(1) + v
2
2(1)
)
q¯(1, 1) +m
t(x, 1) :=
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)
)
q¯(x, 1)−
x∑
x′=2
[
U g¯1 (x
′)− U g¯1 (x′ − 1)− dv1(x′)(1− Q¯1(x′))
]
+m
for each x ≥ 2, and
t(x, y) := t(x, y − 1) + (v12(x) + v22(y)) (q¯(x, y)− q¯(x, y − 1)) (A.43)
for each x ∈ X, y ≥ 2. Denote g∗∗ := (q¯, t). By (A.43), g∗∗ satisfies the buyer’s
local downward EPICs with equality. This fact with the monotonicity of q¯ in y
implies that g∗∗ is EPIC for the buyer. Equation (A.9) in Lemma 5 also implies
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that the allocation g∗∗ yields each type x of seller the interim payoff
U g
∗∗
1 (x) = Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q¯(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
− ug∗∗2 (x, 1)
= U g¯1 (x)− ug
∗∗
2 (x, 1).
Since Ex[u
g∗∗
2 (x, 1)] = Ex[(v
1
2(x) + v
2
2(1))q¯(x, 1) − t(x, 1)] = 0 by definition of m,
Ex[U
g∗∗
1 (x)] = Ex[U
g¯
1 (x)] and g
∗∗ is IIR for the buyer with p1. The allocation g∗∗
satisfies the seller’s local upward BICs with equality because
U g
∗∗
1 (x− 1) = U g¯1 (x− 1) + t(x− 1, 1)−
(
v12(x− 1) + v22(1)
)
q¯(x− 1, 1)
= U g¯1 (x)− dv1(x)(1− Q¯1(x)) + t(x, 1)−
(
v12(x) + v
2
2(1)
)
q¯(x, 1)
= U g
∗∗
1 (x)− dv1(x)(1− Q¯1(x))
for each x ≥ 2. Then g∗∗ satisfies the seller’s local downward BICs because
U g
∗∗
1 (x) ≥ U g
∗∗
1 (x−1)+dv1(x)(1− Q¯1(x−1)) for each x ≥ 2, where the inequality
follows from Q¯1(x − 1) ≥ Q¯1(x). Therefore, the constructed allocation g∗∗ is
feasible in (18), so that it is an ex ante optimal allocation by part (i) with the fact
Ex[U
g∗∗
1 (x)] = Ex[U
g¯
1 (x)]. This completes the proof for (ii).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let g¯ = (q¯, t¯) be the full-information allocation given by
Lemma 3. Each menu (q¯(x, ·), t¯(x, ·)) is a fixed price with a threshold y¯(x). The
allocation g¯ satisfies the buyer’s local downward EPICs and EPIR at the bottom
with equality, so that each type x of seller obtains the interim payoff
U g¯1 (x) = Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q¯(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
by (A.9) in Lemma 5. Fix any x, x′ with x < x′. Together with condition (iii) of
Lemma 3, the assumption that ψ is decreasing in x implies that q¯(x, y) = q¯(x′, y) =
0 if y < y¯(x), and q¯(x, y) = 1 ≥ q¯(x′, y) if y ≥ y¯(x). Hence, Q¯1(·) = Ey[q¯(·, y)] is
decreasing in x.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let U1 := {U g1 ∈ RX | g ∈ ([0, 1] × R)X×Y is feasible}
be the set of the seller’s feasible payoff vectors. Lemma 6 implies {U g1 ∈ RX |
g ∈ ([0, 1] × R)X×Y is feasible and EPIC for the buyer} = U1. Lemma 5 and the
seller’s IIR condition give us a large payment a > 0 to the buyer with {U g1 ∈
RX | g ∈ ([0, 1] × [−a,∞))X×Y is feasible and EPIC for the buyer} = U1. By
the buyer’s IIR condition, we obtain a large payment b > 0 to the seller with
{U g1 ∈ RX | g ∈ ([0, 1] × [−a, b])X×Y is feasible and EPIC for the buyer} = U1.
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Theorem 4 of Myerson (1983) then implies that there is a core mechanism in
([0, 1] × [−a, b])X×Y if the set of basic outcomes is restricted to {0, 1} × {−a, b}
and the set of allocations is ([0, 1]× [−a, b])X×Y . Since U1 is a closed and bounded
subset of RX , we obtain an undominated core mechanism g ∈ ([0, 1]× [−a, b])X×Y
in the restricted environment. Now, the characterization of U1 implies that the
allocation g is an undominated core mechanism in the original environment.
Proof of Proposition 5. To derive a contradiction, suppose that there is an equi-
librium allocation g˜ with U g˜1 (2) > U
g
1 (2). Lemma 7 implies U
g˜
1 (1) ≥ U g¯1 (1), where
g¯ is a full-information allocation. By Lemma 6, we obtain a feasible allocation
g′ that is EPIC for the buyer and satisfies U g
′
1 = U
g˜
1 . Then U
g′
1 (1) ≥ U g¯1 (1)
implies ug
′
2 (1, 1) ≤ 0. Since g′ is IIR for the buyer with p1, ug
′
2 (2, 1) ≥ 0. Let
Z := {x ∈ X | U g′1 (x) > U g1 (x)}. Either Z = {2} or Z = {1, 2} holds. So, for any
Z ′ with Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ X, g′ is pi1-feasible for pi1 := p1/
∑
x∈Z′ p1(x). This contradicts
the assumption that g is a core mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, we prove the former claim. Let g˜ be an allocation
that passes the FGP criterion. Fix any RSW allocation g∗. To derive a con-
tradiction, suppose that g∗ is dominated by a feasible allocation. Since g˜ is an
undominated core mechanism, g˜ dominates g∗. It follows from Lemma 6 that we
obtain a feasible allocation g = (q, t) that is EPIC for the buyer and satisfies
U g1 = U
g˜
1 . Since g dominates g
∗, g cannot be EPIR for the buyer, so that there is
a type x with ug2(x, 1) < 0. Since g is IIR for the buyer with p1, we obtain a type
x′ with ug2(x
′, 1) > 0. Then q(x′, y) > 0 for some y because g is IIR for the seller.
Let ε := ug2(x
′, 1). Lemma 7 also implies x′ > 1.
We construct a new allocation g′ = (q′, t′) as follows. Let (q′(x, ·), t′(x, ·)) :=
(q(x, ·), t(x, ·)) if x < x′. Define q′(x′, ·) := a(x′)q(x′, ·), t′(x′, ·) := a(x′)(t(x′, ·)+ε),
q′(x, ·) := a(x)q′(x− 1, ·) and t′(x, ·) := a(x)(t′(x− 1, ·) + (v12(x)− v12(x− 1))q′(x−
1, ·)) for each x > x′, where a ∈ (0, 1]{x′,...,x¯} is a vector that satisfies a(x′) < 1,
a(x) = 1 if v12(x) = v
1
2(x − 1) for x > x′, U g
′
1 (x
′ | x′ − 1) = U g1 (x′ | x′ − 1), and
U g
′
1 (x) = U
g′
1 (x+ 1 | x) if x′ ≤ x < x¯; the existence of a is guaranteed by the fact
that ε > 0 and g is IIR for the seller. By construction, U g
′
1 (x
′ | x) ≤ U g1 (x′ | x)
if x < x′, and U g
′
1 (x
′ | x) > U g1 (x′ | x) if x ≥ x′. Since U g
′
1 (x
′) > U g1 (x
′) ≥ U g1 (x |
x′) = U g
′
1 (x | x′) for any x < x′ and Q′1(·) := Ey[q′(·, y)] is decreasing in x by
Lemma 1, g′ is BIC for the seller. By induction on x, we can show that ug
′
2 (x, 1) ≥ 0
for any x ≥ x′ and g′ is EPIC for the buyer. Therefore, g′ ∈ BR(pi1, g′), where
pi1 := p1/
∑
x∈Z p1(x) ∈ ∆(Z) and Z := {x ∈ X | U g
′
1 (x) > U
g
1 (x)} ⊆ {x′, ..., x¯}.
This contradicts the assumption that g˜ passes the FGP criterion.
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Next, we prove the latter claim. Assume that an RSW allocation g∗ is undom-
inated. To derive a contradiction, suppose that there is an allocation g′ such that
U g
′
1 (x
′) > U g
∗
1 (x
′) for some x′ ∈ X and g′ ∈ ∪pi1∈Π1BR(pi1, G) for some G ∈ G,
where Π1 is defined by (19) for g = g
∗. We then obtain a belief pi1 ∈ Π1 such that
g′ is a sequential equilibrium allocation of the continuation game given (pi1, G).
Thus, g′ is BIC for the seller and both BIC and IIR for the buyer with pi1. Let
Z := {x ∈ X | U g′1 (x) > U g
∗
1 (x)} and Z0 := {x ∈ X | U g
′
1 (x) = U
g∗
1 (x)}. Now,
pi1 ∈ Π1 means that (i) pi1(x) = 0 if x 6∈ Z ∪ Z0, (ii) pi1(x)/p1(x) ≤ pi1(x′)/p1(x′)
if x ∈ Z0, x′ ∈ Z, and (iii) pi1(x)/p1(x) = pi1(x′)/p1(x′) if x, x′ ∈ Z.
We construct a new allocation g′′ = (q′′, t′′) as follows:
(q′′(x, ·), t′′(x, ·)) := a(x)(q′(x, ·), t′(x, ·)) + (1− a(x)) (q∗(x, ·), t∗(x, ·)),
where a(x) := pi1(x)
p1(x)
/
∑
xˆ∈Z∪Z0
pi1(xˆ)
p1(xˆ)
. The new allocation g′′ dominates g∗. Also, g′′
is BIC for the seller because
U g
′′
1 (x
′) ≥ a(xˆ)U g′1 (x′) + (1− a(xˆ))U g
∗
1 (x
′) ≥ a(xˆ)U g′1 (xˆ | x′) + (1− a(xˆ))U g
∗
1 (xˆ | x′)
U g
′′
1 (x) = U
g∗
1 (x) ≥ a(xˆ)U g
′
1 (xˆ | x) + (1− a(xˆ))U g
∗
1 (xˆ | x)
for any x′ ∈ Z, x 6∈ Z, xˆ ∈ X. Since g′ is BIC and IIR for the buyer with pi1
and g∗ is EPIC and EPIR for the buyer, the new allocation g′′ is feasible. This
contradicts the assumption that g∗ is undominated.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let g∗ and g¯ = (q¯, t¯) be RSW and full-information alloca-
tions respectively. First, we prove the former claim. Assume that g is a strongly
neologism-proof allocation. Since g passes the FGP criterion, so does g∗ by Propo-
sition 6. Hence, U g1 = U
g∗
1 . To derive a contradiction, suppose U
g∗
1 6= U g¯1 . By The-
orem 7, we obtain a type x′ with U g
∗
1 (x
′) < U g¯1 (x
′). Now, the menu (q¯(x′, ·), t¯(x′, ·))
is pi1-feasible for pi1(x
′) := 1. This contradicts the assumption that g is strongly
neologism-proof.
Next, we prove the latter claim. Assume U g
∗
1 = U
g¯
1 . We show that g
∗ is strongly
neologism-proof. To derive a contradiction, suppose that for some pi1 ∈ ∆(X),
there is a pi1-feasible allocation g
′ that satisfies (20) and (21). By considering
pi1/
∑
pi1(x)>0
pi1(x) as the full-support prior p1 in Lemma 6, we obtain an allocation
g′′ such that g′′ is IIR for the buyer with pi1, and if pi1(x) > 0, then u
g′′
2 (x, y) ≥
ug
′′
2 (yˆ | x, y) for any yˆ and U g
′′
1 (x) = U
g′
1 (x). By (20), U
g′′
1 (x) > U
g∗
1 (x) = U
g¯
1 (x)
and thus ug
′′
2 (x, 1) < 0 for some x with pi1(x) > 0. We then obtain a type x
′ with
ug
′′
2 (x
′, 1) > 0 and pi1(x′) > 0. This contradicts U
g′′
1 (x
′) ≥ U g∗1 (x′) = U g¯1 (x′).
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B Supplementary material
B.1 Equilibrium payoffs in the motivating example
This section characterizes the set of equilibrium interim payoff vectors for the
seller in the motivating example of Section 2. Assume that X = Y = {1, 2},
v11(x) + v
2
1(y) = 100x, v
1
2(x) + v
2
2(y) = 100(x + y), p1 ≡ 1/2, and p2 ≡ 1/2. Let
g = (q, t) be an equilibrium allocation. We show that the set of equilibrium interim
payoff vectors is characterized by the following system of linear inequalities (i.e.,
the red triangle in Figure B.1):
U g1 (2) ≥ 800/3 (B.1)
U g1 (2) ≤ U g1 (1)/3 + 200 (B.2)
U g1 (2) ≤ 500− U g1 (1) (B.3)
Figure B.1: Seller’s interim expected payoff vectors
(i) We show that U g1 must satisfy (B.1). To derive a contradiction, suppose
U g1 (2) < 800/3. Fix any ε > 0 with ε < 800/3 − U g1 (2) and ε < 100/3. We
now define a mechanism G = 〈X,∅, q, t〉 by q(1) := 1, q(2) := 2/3, t(1) :=
300− ε and t(2) := 800/3− 2ε. Since t(1)− t(2)− 100(q(1)− q(2)) = ε > 0 and
t(2)− t(1) + 200(q(1)− q(2)) = 100/3− ε > 0, truth-telling is a strictly dominant
action in G for each type of seller. Then the buyer of y = 1 should reject G because
pi1(1)(200q(1)−t(1))+pi1(2)(300q(2)−t(2)) < 0 for any pi1 ∈ ∆(X). Also, the buyer
of y = 2 should accept G because pi1(1)(300q(1)− t(1)) + pi1(2)(400q(2)− t(2)) >
0 for any pi1 ∈ ∆(X). Thus, the seller of x = 2 obtains the interim payoff
200/2 + (t(2) + 200(1− q(2)))/2 = 800/3− ε by deviating from the equilibrium to
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G. This is a contradiction.
(ii) We show that U g1 must satisfy both (B.2) and (B.3). Part (ii) of Lemma
6 in the paper allows us to assume that g is EPIC for the buyer and ug2(x, y) =
ug2(y − 1 | x, y) for any x ∈ X, y ≥ 2. Lemma 5 in the paper then implies
ug2(x, 1) = Ey
[(
ψ(x) + φ(y)− 1− P2(y)
p2(y)
dv2(y)
)
q(x, y) + v11(x) + v
2
1(y)
]
− U g1 (x)
= 100q(x, 2) + v11(x)− U g1 (x) (B.4)
for any x. Since g is BIC for the seller and IIR for the buyer with p1, we obtain
U g1 (2)− U g1 (1) ≤ 100− 50(q(2, 1) + q(2, 2)), (B.5)
U g1 (2)− U g1 (1) ≥ 100− 50(q(1, 1) + q(1, 2)), (B.6)
U g1 (2) + U
g
1 (1) ≤ 100(q(1, 2) + q(2, 2)) + 300, (B.7)
where the last inequality follows from Ex[u
g
2(x, 1)] ≥ 0. Since q(1, 2) + q(2, 2) ≤ 2,
(B.7) implies (B.3). By (B.5) and (B.7), we obtain
U g1 (2) ≤ (U g1 (1) + 500 + 100(q(1, 2)− q(2, 1)))/3. (B.8)
Since q(1, 2)− q(2, 1) ≤ 1, (B.8) implies (B.2).
(iii) By Theorem 1 in the paper, any feasible allocation that weakly dominates
an RSW allocation g∗ is an equilibrium allocation. The RSW payoff vector is
U g
∗
1 = (200, 800/3). Let U
g
1 be an interim payoff vector that satisfies (B.1)–
(B.3). We complete the proof by showing that there is a feasible allocation g with
U
g
1 = U
g
1 . Define an allocation g
′ = (q′, t′) by q′(1, 1) = q′(1, 2) = q′(2, 2) = 1,
q′(2, 1) = 0, t′(1, 1) = t′(1, 2) = 225, t′(2, 1) = −25 and t′(2, 2) = 375. Then
U g
′
1 = (225, 275), which is vector A in Figure B.1. Now, g
′ is EPIC for the
buyer and satisfies (B.5)–(B.7), so that g′ is feasible. Define a payment rule t′′
by t′′(1, 1) = t′′(1, 2) = 700/3, t′′(2, 1) = −100/3 and t′′(2, 2) = 1100/3. Then
the allocation g′′ := (q′, t′′) satisfies U g
′′
1 = (700/3, 800/3), which is vector B in
Figure B.1. Now, g′′ is EPIC for the buyer and satisfies (B.5)–(B.7), so that g′′ is
feasible. Therefore, some convex combination of g′, g′′, g∗, which is feasible, yields
the seller’s interim payoff vector U g1 . This completes the proof.
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B.2 Core mechanism and neutral optimum
This section provides an example where some core mechanism and some neutral
optimum are dominated by another feasible allocation. We say that a feasible
allocation g is a neutral optimum if there exists some b > 0 such that, for any
real number a ≥ b, g is a neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson (1983), in the
environment where the set of basic outcomes is restricted to {0, 1} × {−a, a} and
the set of allocations is ([0, 1]× [−a, a])X×Y .
Assume that X = Y = {1, 2}, v11(x) = 10x + 70, v21(y) = 0, v12(x) = 60x,
v22(y) = 10y, and p1 = p2 ≡ 1/2. The no-trade mechanism is an RSW allocation, so
that the seller’s RSW payoff vector is U g
∗
1 = (80, 90). Thus, the set of equilibrium
payoff vectors for the seller is U1 := {U g1 ∈ RX | g ∈ ([0, 1] × R)X×Y is feasible}.
In a similar way to Section B.1, we can show that U1 is characterized by the red
trapezoid in Figure B.2. Here, vector A is (100, 100) and vector B is (95, 100). By
Proposition 5 in the paper, g is a core mechanism only if U g1 (2) = 100. Fix any
feasible allocation g with U g1 (1) ∈ [95, 100] and U g1 (2) = 100.
Figure B.2: Seller’s interim expected payoff vectors
First, we claim that g is a core mechanism. Take any feasible allocation g′.
Then U g
′
1 (2) ≤ 100 = U g1 (2). Hence, Z := {x ∈ X | U g
′
1 (x) > U
g
1 (x)} ⊆ {1}. Now,
if g′ is pi1-feasible for pi1(1) = 1, then U
g′
1 (1) = U
g¯
1 (1) = 80 < U
g
1 (1), where g¯ is a
full-information allocation. Thus, g′ cannot satisfy condition (ii) in the definition
of core mechanism. This means that g is a core mechanism.
Second, we claim that g is a neutral optimum. Any feasible allocation that
dominates a neutral optimum is also a neutral optimum (by the axiom of “dom-
ination”). Hence, we assume without loss of generality that U g1 = (95, 100). We
prove the claim by applying Myerson’s characterization theorem of the neutral
optimum. We use the same notation as in Section 8 of Myerson (1983). As in
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the proof of Proposition 4 in this paper, let a > 0 be a large payment such that
g ∈ ([0, 1] × [−a, a])X×Y and {U g′1 ∈ RX | g′ ∈ ([0, 1] × [−a, a])X×Y is feasible} =
U1. We temporarily restrict our environment so that the set of basic outcomes is
D := {0, 1} × {−a, a} and the set of allocations is ([0, 1] × [−a, a])X×Y . For any
(q, t) ∈ D, (x, y) ∈ X × Y , λ ∈ RX+ and α = (α1, α2, α2,0) ∈ RX+ × RY+ × RY+, we
define
L((q, t), (x, y), λ, α)
:= λ(x)p2(y)
[
t+ (1− q)v11(x)
]
+ α2,0(y)p1(x)
[
q(v12(x) + v
2
2(y))− t
]
+ α1(xˆ | x)p2(y)
[
t+ (1− q)v11(x)
]− α1(x | xˆ)p2(y) [t+ (1− q)v11(xˆ)]
+ α2(yˆ | y)p1(x)
[
q(v12(x) + v
2
2(y))− t
]− α2(y | yˆ)p1(x) [q(v12(x) + v22(yˆ))− t] ,
where xˆ 6= x and yˆ 6= y.
Theorem 7 of Myerson (1983) states that the feasible allocation g is a neutral
optimum for the seller if and only if there exist sequences (λk, αk, ωk)∞k=1 such that
λk ∈ RX++, αk = (αk1, αk2, αk2,0) ∈ RX+ × RY+ × RY+, ωk ∈ RX , ∀k, (B.1)(
λk(1) + αk1(2 | 1)
)
ωk(1)− αk1(1 | 2)ωk(2) =
2∑
y=1
max
d∈D
L(d, (1, y), λk, αk),∀k, (B.2)
(
λk(2) + αk1(1 | 2)
)
ωk(2)− αk1(2 | 1)ωk(1) =
2∑
y=1
max
d∈D
L(d, (2, y), λk, αk),∀k, (B.3)
lim sup
k→∞
ωk(x) ≤ U g1 (x), ∀x ∈ X. (B.4)
For each k ∈ N, we define λk ∈ RX++, αk = (αk1, αk2, αk2,0) ∈ RX+ × RY+ × RY+ by
λk(1) := 1/k, λk(2) := 2− 1/k,
αk1(2 | 1) := 3− 1/k, αk1(1 | 2) := 2,
αk2(2 | 1) := 0, αk2(1 | 2) := 1, αk2,0(1) := 2, αk2,0(2) := 0.
By substituting λk, αk into the function L, we obtain that, for any (q, t) ∈ D,
L((q, t), (1, 1), λk, αk) = 30, (B.5)
L((q, t), (1, 2), λk, αk) = 10q + 30, (B.6)
L((q, t), (2, 1), λk, αk) = (5/k)q + 60− 5/k, (B.7)
L((q, t), (2, 2), λk, αk) = (10 + 5/k)q + 60− 5/k. (B.8)
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By substituting (B.5)–(B.8) into (B.2) and (B.3), we obtain
ωk(1) :=
540k − 70
6k − 1 , ω
k(2) :=
3
2
(
540k − 70
6k − 1
)
− 35.
Since ωk(1) → 90 < 95 = U g1 (1) and ωk(2) → 100 = U g1 (2) as k → ∞, the
sequences (λk, αk, ωk)∞k=1 satisfy conditions (B.1)–(B.4). So, g is a neutral optimum
in the restricted environment where the set of basic outcomes is D = {0, 1} ×
{−a, a} and the set of allocations is ([0, 1] × [−a, a])X×Y . Since a > 0 can be
arbitrarily large, g is a neutral optimum in the original environment.
B.3 FGP and strongly neologism-proofness
This section provides an example where an allocation that passes the FGP criterion
is not strongly neologism-proof. Assume that X = Y = {1, 2}, v11(x) + v21(y) =
100x, v12(x) + v
2
2(y) = 100(x + y), p1 ≡ 1/2, p2(1) = 3/4 and p2(2) = 1/4. Then
the unique full-information allocation g¯ = (q¯, t¯) is given by q¯ ≡ 1, t¯(1, ·) ≡ 200
and t¯(2, ·) ≡ 300. The seller’s payoff vector is U g¯1 = (200, 300). Also, the unique
RSW allocation g∗ = (q∗, t∗) is given by q∗(1, ·) ≡ 1, t∗(1, ·) ≡ 200, q∗(2, 1) = 1/5,
q∗(2, 2) = 1, t∗(2, 1) = 60 and t∗(2, 2) = 380. The seller’s RSW payoff vector
is U g
∗
1 = (200, 260). Here, the RSW allocation g
∗ is undominated, so that g∗
passes the FGP criterion by Proposition 6 in the paper. On the other hand, since
U g
∗
1 6= U g¯1 , there is no strongly neologism-proof allocation by Proposition 7 in the
paper. Therefore, g∗ cannot be strongly neologism-proof.
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